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RETRYING RACE 
Anthony V. Alfieri* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Essay investigates the renewed prosecution of long-dormant 
criminal and civil rights cases of white-on-black racial violence arising 
out of the 1950s and 1960s. The study is part of an ongoing project on 
race, lawyers, and ethics within the criminal-justice system.' Framed 
by this larger project, the Essay explores the normative and sociolegal 
meaning of that resurgent prosecution. My hope in pursuing this 
inquiry is to better understand, and perhaps begin to refashion, the 
prosecutor's redemptive role in cases of racial violence.2 
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Ethics and Public Service, University of 
Miami School of Law. A.B. 1981, Brown University; J.D. 1984, Columbia University School 
of Law. - Ed. I am grateful to Adrian Barker, Richard Delgado, John Ely, Michael Fischl, 
Ellen Grant, Patrick Gudridge, Amelia Hope, Don Jones, Cynthia McKenzie, Martha 
Minow, Harriet Roberts, Peggy Russell, Jonathan Simon, Karen Throckmorton, Frank Val­
des, and Eric Yamamoto for their comments and support. 
I also wish to thank Javier Avino, Wendy Blasius, David Birke, Chauncey Kelly, Lauren 
Luis, Claudine Rigaud, Nathaniel Tobin, and the University of Miami School of Law library 
staff for their research assistance, as well as Nadia Shihata and the editors of the Michigan 
Law Review for their devotion. 
This Essay mourns for my father, John B. Alfieri, no one to drive the car. 
1. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1995) (ex­
ploring the rhetoric of race in cases of black-on-white racially motivated violence; citing the 
defense of Damian Williams and Henry Watson on charges of beating Reginald Denny and 
others during the 1992 South Central Los Angeles riots); Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: 
Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1997) (probing racial rhetoric 
in cases of white-on-black racially incited violence; noting the civil and criminal trial of the 
Ku Klux Klan in the 1981 lynching of Michael Donald); Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, 
48 DUKEL.J.1157 (1999) (examining the federal prosecution of five white New York City police 
officers charged with assaulting Abner Louima, a young male Haitian immigrant, in 1997); 
Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 STAN. L. REV. 809 
(2000) (hereinafter Alfieri, Prosecuting Violence/Reconstructing Community) (discussing the 
1990-91 Central Park Jogger sexual assault trials in New York City and the 1998-99 James Byrd 
capital murder trials in Jasper, Texas); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, 89 
GEO. L.J. 2228 (2001) (assembling "race-conscious, community regarding methods of represen­
tation culled from conventional and alternative models of criminal prosecution and defense"); 
Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 1293 (1998) (hereinafter Alfieri, Race Trials) 
(analyzing the rhetorical meaning of race in the federal and state trials of Lemrick Nelson, 
which grew out of four days of interracial violence in the Crown Heights section of Brook­
lyn, New York, in 1991). 
2. Prior efforts in this enterprise to reconstruct prosecutor and defender roles have 
sparked criticism. See, e.g. , Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives: 
Discovering the Road Less Traveled, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 788 (1996); Richard Delgado, 
Making Pets: Social Workers, "Problem Groups," and the Role of the SPCA - Getting a Lit­
tle More Precise About Racialized Narratives, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 1571 (1999); Christopher 
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Both descriptive and prescriptive in nature, the inquiry addresses 
race in relation to law and community.3 Grappling with the historical 
violence accompanying that troubled relationship, the Essay employs 
the notion of race cases to decipher juridical forms of white-on-black 
violence, parsing their content and tracing their genealogy in selected 
criminal and civil rights prosecutions of the 1950s and 1960s.4 The 
central purpose of this inquiry is to ground the justification for retry­
ing race cases in the discretionary ethics of the prosecution function 
and the normative jurisprudence of criminal justice. 
Race cases present hard and easy judgments of prosecutorial 
discretion. The threshold justification for retrying race cases comes 
from the standard conception of discretion and its adversary system­
based sources of normative guidance. Under standard discretion, easy 
cases for retrial emerge from supervening events material to the 
outcome of prior prosecutions, such as the discovery of new physical 
evidence, the identification of new witnesses, and the belated proffer 
of inculpating confessions. Hard cases, by comparison, resurface on 
their own strength of merit without the benefit of supervening events. 
In such cases, prosecutors adduce no new evidence, produce no new 
witnesses, and offer no startling "deathbed" confessions. Instead, they 
grasp the elusive opportunity to right historical wrongs committed in 
aborted or failed criminal and civil rights prosecutions. 
Standard discretion permits prosecutors to seize the opportunity to 
renew aborted and correct failed race case proceedings. The seizure of 
prosecutorial power, however well-intentioned, is distinct from the 
reasoned exercise of prosecutorial discretion. To be sure, power is the 
necessary precondition of discretion. Yet, power alone is insufficient 
to give reasoned justification for reopening long-dormant cases. 
Indeed, if the reopening of race cases turned solely on evenhanded­
prosecutorial power, then black victims would not have been made to 
suffer decades of irrevocable loss and white lawbreakers would not 
have enjoyed the freedom of lasting immunity. 
The hazard of extending the inquiry of reopening beyond the 
bluntness of curative power is both theoretical and practical. Power 
infects law and society.5 It adopts manifold public and private forms. 
Slobogin, Race-Based Defenses - The Insights of Traditional Analysis, 54 ARK. L. REV. 739 
(2002); Abbe Smith, Burdening the Least of Us: "Race-Conscious" Ethics in Criminal De­
fense, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 1585 (1999). But see Alex J. Hurder, The Pursuit of Justice: New 
Directions in Scholarship About the Practice of Law, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 185-86 (2002). 
3. For an elegant account of the intersection of law and community, see AVIAM SOIFER, 
LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP (1995). 
4. See infra Section II.A. 
5. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE 
PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books ed. 1979) (1975); JUSTICE AND POWER IN 
SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES ( Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998); Jonathan Simon, 
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And it finds expression in myriad state, institutional, and individual 
actions. Allied with race, it distorts lawyer cognition and episte­
mology, and deforms sociolegal discourse and ideology. The upshot of 
that alliance is displayed in the decades of prosecutorial inaction to­
ward reopening race cases. 
The clandestine alliance of race and power endangers efforts to 
explicate and justify reopening under the ethical and jurisprudential 
norms of criminal justice. Inside the criminal-justice system, race and 
power seem veiled, furtively encircling prosecutors and fouling their 
professional judgment. Ensnared by race-embedded tradition, 
prosecutors seem inured to ethical or jurisprudential calls for reopen­
ing. And yet, drawing on the tenets of liberal legalism, the criminal­
justice system concedes not only a measure of independence to 
prosecutors, but also a degree of autonomy to law.6 
Predicated on liberal legalism, the call for reopening echoes the 
precepts of lawyer independence and the autonomy of law. Like 
power, however, these precepts mix with race to constrain prosecutor . 
independence and jurisprudential autonomy. The constraint rises from 
color and the foundational commitment to a colorblind jurisprudence. 
Unsurprisingly, the jurisprudence of a colorblind faith in criminal­
justice prosecutions in part explains the reopening of dormant race 
cases. As to black victims and white offenders, that faith dictates 
equality of treatment, for example, in the submission of new evidence. 
But that explanation applies only to easy cases of newly discovered 
evidence. It fails to explain the delay in reopening hard cases, where 
prosecutorial judgment is solely at stake. 
The genesis of a colorblind commitment to criminal justice extends 
far into American legal history. Colorblind claims propound a prose­
cutorial stance of neutrality toward race and race cases. For prosecu­
tors occupying this stance and contemplating reopening criminal and 
civil rights cases, race is inapposite. But for divergences of fact or law, 
like cases are to be treated alike in context and in retrospect. 
The aesthetics and mechanics of colorblind prosecution offer an 
appealing formalism. As a model of legal process, prosecutorial 
formalism carries integrity and efficiency. Yet, when applied to dor­
mant race cases, it lacks an explanation and a justification for histori­
cal delay. Putting aside lawyer error or misconduct, colorblind prose­
cutors cannot account for either delay or failure in reopening past 
prosecutions, except to cite extra-judicial sources of interference, such 
as jury nullification, police corruption or witness intimidation. 
Between Power and Knowledge: Habermas, Foucault, and the Future of Legal Studies, 28 
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 947 (1994). 
6. See E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 219-69 
(1975). 
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The contemporary legacy of colorblind prosecution is color-coded 
pretext. Driven by mixed motives, the twin desires to stand presently 
unbiased and rectify past injustice, color-coded claims maintain a 
disinterested stance while surreptitiously evoking, and often exploit­
ing, racial status and stereotypes. Posed as dispassionate and objective, 
color-coded prosecutions impart a familiar instrumentalism. Unlike a 
formalist model of legal process, instrumentalism is purposive and 
result-oriented. As a model, however, it lacks candor and risks unfair­
ness to both victim and offender. Despite a lack of transparency and 
the risk of unfairness, color-coded prosecutions supply a legitimate 
justification for reopening race cases. Outcome-orientation notwith­
standing, color-coded-driven reopenings advance dignity and equality 
norms on behalf of the victim and the state. Reopening affirms the 
dignity and worth of the victim as an inviolate person. At the same 
time, it vindicates the state interest in the equal protection of criminal 
and civil rights laws. That normative advancement sacrifices the 
process values of candor, openness, and fairness. 
The normative costs of color-coded prosecutions leave race­
conscious discretion as an alternative justification for reopening 
abandoned race cases. Race-conscious discretion posits color as a key 
constituent of sociolegal roles, relationships, and institutions. Sensitive 
to the starkness of and gradations in color, race-conscious prosecutors 
survey white offenders, black victims, and their assembled public and 
private communities for signs of color consciousness. In this way, they 
seek to reincorporate community into the prosecution function and 
the criminal-justice process. Under race-conscious discretion, color 
connects private lawbreaking and public responsibility. Admitting 
collective responsibility and demonstrating contrition within white­
offender communities and embracing the obligations of forgiveness 
and showing mercy within black-victim communities link restorative 
justice imperatives to the exercise of race-conscious discretion. That 
linkage introduces a redemptive role for prosecutors in retrying cases 
of racial violence. 
Redemption-spurred restorative discretion in race cases is color­
conscious. Discarding the pretense of colorblind claims and the pre­
text of color-coded contentions, restorative discretion urges candor in 
recollecting local histories of racial violence and in reconciling painful 
differences of cross-racial community. Candor is tied to an open call 
for offender atonement and victim mercy. That call fastens retributive 
theories of punishment to redemption and reconciliation norms, 
integrating offender contrition and victim forgiveness while mitigating 
vengeance. Stitching retributive and restorative theories of punish­
ment into a race-conscious model of lawyer discretion furnishes a 
redemptive process for prosecutors sullied by decades-old failure and 
decades-long neglect of criminal and civil rights cases. Redemption 
requires the reconception of victim, offender, and community identity, 
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the translation of their private segregated narratives into public 
empathic dialogues, and the revision of prosecutorial norms and prac­
tices to engender cross-racial conversations and restorative collabora­
tions. 
To muster a redemptive appraisal of prosecutorial norms and prac­
tices in retrying cases of white-on-black violence, the Essay will be 
divided into five parts. Part I examines the place of race in law and 
community. Part II outlines a genealogy of race cases and describes 
the renewed prosecution of criminal and civil rights cases winnowed 
from the 1950s and 1960s. Part III evaluates the standard conception 
of prosecutorial discretion as a j ustification for retrying race cases. 
Part IV analyzes the notion of race-conscious discretion as an alterna­
tive j ustification. Part V assesses the idea of community-guided 
restorative discretion as an additional j ustification. The Essay con­
cludes with a reconsideration of prosecutorial ethics and community 
norms in retrying cases of racial violence. 
I. RACE I N  LAW A N D COMMU NITY 
Race colors law, crime, and community. It shadows the perform­
ance of public and private roles. It shades the meaning of relation­
ships. And it stains the operating norms of institutions. Narrowly 
crafted, this Essay neither transforms the standard conceptions of 
criminal-justice roles, relationships, and institutions, nor adjusts the 
boundaries of colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious representa­
tion. Instead, it parses the meaning of prosecutorial norms and their 
function in the context of retrying previously abandoned cases of 
white-on-black racial violence. The focal points of the analysis are race 
and redemptive community.7 
The subjects of race and community have gained increased atten­
tion in legal theory and practice. Both the Critical Race Theory8 and 
7. The themes of race and community unite the essays in this Colloquium. See Richard 
Delgado, White Interests and Civil Rights Realism: Rodrigo's Bittersweet Epiphany, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 1201 (2003); Margaret M. Russell, Cleansing Moments and Retrospective Jus­
tice, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1225 (2003); Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice on 
Trial - Again: African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 1269 (2003). For studies of racial reconciliation and redemption, see 
HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING: CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN BLACKS 
AND WHITES (1995), and ERIC K. y AMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND 
RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1999): 
8. See CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997); 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancis eds., 2d 
ed. 2000); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 
(Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002); see also ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, 
RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1998); MIXED RACE AMERICA AND 
THE LAW: A READER (Kevin R. Johnson ed., 2003). 
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LatCrit9 movements proclaim ... race as central to legal theory and 
sociolegal studies. Likewise, both the community prosecution and 
defender movementsro and the restorative j ustice movement11 declare 
community as crucial to legal practice. Race and community seem 
equally pivotal to adjudication.12 Yet academics, policymakers, and 
practitioners (prosecutors, defenders, and j udges) remain at variance 
in their appraisals of the normative value and sociolegal meaning of 
race and community in the criminal-justice system. 
Like the much-debated turn to norms and social meaning in recent 
criminal-justice-policy research,13 this Essay challenges the standard 
9. See Symposium, LatCrit: Latinas/as and the Law, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (1997), 10 LA 
RAZA L.J. 1 (1998); Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New Discourse of 
Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997); see also THE LATINO/A 
CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998). 
10. The community prosecution movement encourages federal and state prosecutors to 
collaborate with local governmental (e.g., police departments and criminal courts) and non­
governmental (e.g., block associations and neighborhood groups) organizations in designing 
innovative, community-based crime prevention and law enforcement initiatives. See Elaine 
Nugent & Gerard A. Rainville, The State of Community Prosecution: Results of a National 
Survey, PROSECUTOR, Mar./ Apr. 2001 , at 26. By contrast, the community defender move­
ment promotes multidisciplinary approaches to offender rehabilitation, offering individual­
ized support services aimed at community reintegration. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Community 
Prosecutors, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1465 (2002) [hereinafter Alfieri, Community Prosecutors]; Cait 
Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders in the Community: Expanding the Conceptual and lnsti­
llltiona/ Boundaries of Providing Counsel to the Poor, 1 4  GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 401 (2001); 
Kim Taylor-Thompson, Effective Assistance: Reconceiving the Role of the Chief Public De­
fender, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 199 ( 1 999); Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a 
Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321 (2002). 
1 1. The restorative justice movement addresses both the agents and institutions of the 
criminal-justice system, offering prosecutors, defenders, and judges a dissonant ethos of vic­
tim-centered offender punishment and offender-specific community restoration. Remarking 
on this discord, Robert Cochran observes: "[Rjestorative justice takes the offender's crime 
seriously and calls for repentance and restitution." Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Criminal De­
fense Attorney: Roadblock or Bridge to Restorative Justice, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 21 1 ,  213 
(1999-2000); see also Frederick W. Gay, Restorative Justice and the Prosecutor, 27 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1651 (2000); Daniel W. Van Ness, New Wine and Old Wineskins: Four Challenges 
of Restorative Justice, 4 CRIM. L.F. 251 (1993); Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Pros­
pects for Restorative Justice in the United States (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author). On the discordant sociology of punishment, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP 
PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1990), and 
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001). 
1 2. See Kathryn Abrams, Critical Strategy and the Judicial Evasion of Difference, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 1426 (2000); Ian F. Haney L6pez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct 
and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000); Lis Wiehl, "Sound­
ing Black" in the Courtroom: Court-Sanctioned Racial Stereotyping, 18 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER L.J. 185 (2002). 
1 3. Compare Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 609 (1998), and Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Or­
der in the Inner City, 32 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 805 (1998), with Elizabeth Anderson, Beyond 
Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories of Social Norms, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
1 70 (2000), and Bernard E. Harcourt, After the "Social Meaning Turn": Implications for Re­
search Design and Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34 
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 179 (2000), and Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus; Catt-
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adversarial conception of criminal-justice roles, relationships, and 
institutions.14 Fundamentally, it contests the partisan, instrumental 
tradition of prosecutor roles. Moreover, it disputes prosecutor rela­
tionships with offenders, victims, and the state.15 Further, it questions 
the function of race in prosecutor offices across advocacy, outreach, 
and training. For each role, relationship, and institutional practice, the 
Essay checks the construction of racial identity in prosecutor narra­
tives, probing for signs of colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious 
representation. 
Like earlier interdisciplinary approaches to the study of race in 
American law drawn from legal anthropology,16 history,17 and the law­
and-society movement,18 the Essay views the social construction of 
color in law as a means to understand racial ideology in culture and 
society.19 The task is to gauge the colored discourses - spoken and 
tionary Notes on the New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 
973 (2000). 
14. On the standard adversarial conception of lawyering, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS 
AND JUSTICE: AN ErnICAL STUDY 50-103 (1988), and Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Mo­
rality, in THE GOOD LAWYER 25-37 (David Luban ed., 1983). 
15. Here, the term "state" is used interchangeably to refer to federal, state, and local 
entities. The term implies government under the auspices of legislative, judicial, and execu­
tive branches operating at national, state, and local levels. 
1 6. See JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND ART (1988); JOHN COMAROFF & JEAN COMAROFF, 
ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION (1992); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL 
KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983); CONTESTED 
STATES: LAW, HEGEMONY AND RESISTANCE (Mindie Lazarus-Black & Susan F. Hirsh eds., 
1994); John L. Comaroff, The Discourse of Rights in Colonial South Africa: Subjectivity, Sov­
ereignty, Modernity, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 193 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. 
Keams eds., 1995); Carol J. Greenhouse, Courting Difference: Issues of Interpretation and 
Comparison in the Study of Legal Ideologies, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 687 (1988); Sally Engle 
Merry, Law and Colonialism, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 889 (1991 ). 
17. See JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO (1994); RACE ON TRIAL: LAW 
AND JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Annette Gordon-Reed ed., 2002); William w. Fisher 
Ill, Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery, 68 CHt.-KENT L. REV. 1051 (1993); Robert 
W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating 
Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 
109 (1998); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993). 
18. See RACE, LAW, & CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
(Austin Sarat ed., 1997); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and 
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural 
Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1995). 
19 .  On law and culture, see PAUL w. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: 
RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999); THOMAS Ross, JUST STORIES: How TIIE 
LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND BIAS ( 1 996); Paul Schiff Berman, The Cultural Life of Capital 
Punishment: Surveying the Benefits of a Cultural Analysis of Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1129 
(2002); Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
1149 (1997); and Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?: Cultural Analysis, 
Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3 (2001). 
See also Jessica M. Silbey, What We Do When We Do Law and Popular Culture, 27 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 139 (2002). 
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unspoken - of prosecutors inscribed in the texts of criminal-justice 
advocacy. My thesis, garnered from prior studies of death penalty and 
poverty-law practice,20 is that color-tinged criminal-justice narratives 
deform the public and private identity of offenders, victims, and their 
allied communities. 
By narrative I mean story, voiced descriptively or prescriptively.21 
Akin to criminal-defense lawyers, prosecutors tell stories about law 
and society.22 Everyday they talk of crime, the criminal law, and the 
criminal-justice system. They talk in advocacy through opening 
statements, direct examinations, and closing arguments at hearings, 
trials, and appeals. Their talk, at once prosaic and metaphorical, 
echoes in the texts of colloquies, memoranda, and opinions. By text I 
mean both the physical record (transcript, brief, or order) and the 
social context (law office, jail, or courthouse) of juridical speech and 
conduct. The norms and meanings heard in these texts bear moral 
consequence. 
Liberal theory recognizes the moral import of juridical speech in 
its oral, written, and symbolic figurations. The gravity of speech 
gathers weight under feminist and critical race readings of law and 
sociolegal relations. Derivative of liberalism, these readings depart 
from pluralist tendencies toward neutrality and tolerance. For femi­
nists, speech breaches neutrality in the· political economy of the 
marketplace and the workplace, causing psychological and economic 
harm. The harm may deform the identity of women, as in the case of 
pornography, or silence the voice of women, as in the case of a hostile 
work environment. Left unregulated, the aggressions of speech repro­
duce gendered hierarchies of female submission.23 For critical race 
20. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and Delay: The Moral Politics of Death 
Penalty Abolitionists, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325 (1996); Anthony V. Alfieri, Recon­
structive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J 2107 
(1991); Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing Community, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1747 (1994) (re­
viewing GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF 
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992)). 
21 .  See LAW STORIES (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996); LAW'S STORIES: 
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). 
22. See Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.­
C.L. L. REV. 353 (1996); Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative 
Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39 (1994); David Dante Troutt, Screws, 
Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional Narratives in Federal Police Brutality 
Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18 (1999); see also Paul Schiff Berman, Rats, Pigs and Stat­
ues on Trial: The Creation of Cultural Narratives in the Prosecution of Animals and Inani­
mate Objects, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 288 (1994). 
23. See ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 24-47 (The 
Women's Press Ltd. 1981) (1979); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: 
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 206-13 (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 
71-110 (1993); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
195-214 (1989); cf. NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, 
AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1995). 
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theorists, speech may strike blows against the body of the self and the 
bond of community. The blows of hate speech strike especially hard. 
Unimpeded by regulation, the individual and collective assaults of 
derogatory speech fortify the lines of segregation.24 
Modern in tone, the proffered readings of feminists and critical 
race theorists concerning speech-induced injury extend under post­
modern analysis as well. Keenly attentive to the identity grammar of 
language, postmodern jurisprudence views the liberal subject 
(offender or victim) as the product of interlocking public and private 
discourses. For illustration, consider the victim-as-subject. For post­
modernists, the very idea of the victim and the experience of victimi­
zation are heavily contingent on the accretion of historical portrayals 
in culture and society. These discourse-sketched portraits depict 
images and convey meanings that describe and prescribe the behavior 
expected of victims. Ingrained in the conscious and unconscious mind 
and interwoven into society, the discourses - oral and written 
histories - manufacture the character and perception of the victim in 
the courtroom and in the world. The communication norms regulating 
speech at these and other overlapping sites help mold in private 
imagination and in public performance the stance of the victim toward 
society and the posture of society toward the victim. This complex 
interchange in no way forecloses agency: the subjective engagement 
with, and intervention upon, the world outside the self. Freedom and 
volition persist, albeit in an often highly structured space enclosed by 
larger forces and material necessity.25 
Both modem and postmodern liberal norms connect dignity to 
personhood and liberty to agency. On this logic, when dignity is 
diminished, personhood suffers. Similarly, when liberty is curbed by a 
caste structure based on an immutable characteristic like race, the 
freedom of agency,26 of self-intervention in the outside world, wanes 
for individuals, for their affiliated groups, and for their local and even 
national communities. To the extent that lawyer speech adversely 
24. See MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, 
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); Petal Nevella Modeste, Race 
Hate Speech: The Pervasive Badge of Slavery that Mocks the Thirteenth Amendment, 44 
HOWARD L.J. 311  (2001); Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of 
Mutual Indifference, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1283 (2000). 
25. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM 
TO POSTMODERN ISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE (2000); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN 
LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END (1995); PIERRE 
SCHLAG, LA YING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
MIND 24 (1996). 
26. On the moral agency of the subject in liberal legalism and feminist jurisprudence, 
see Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
1 169 (1998); Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal 
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995). See also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL 
JUSTICE 55-80 (1999). 
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affects the private self-worth or public caste-standing of participants 
(offenders and victims) in the criminal-justice system, it demeans indi­
vidual dignity and curtails collective liberty in society. 
To be sure, neither the debasement of individual dignity nor the 
constriction of collective liberty enacted by law or custom and 
enforced by state or private action obliterates identity. For offenders 
and victims, identity is too deep-rooted in its origins (for example, 
family, faith, school) and too multifaceted in its dimensions (for 
example, race, gender, class) to be easily upended or dismantled. But 
identity may be damaged if ideological discourses are pernicious and 
sociolegal conditions are oppressive. The damage is twofold. Dignity 
may be so trampled that the integrity or intrinsic value of the wounded 
person becomes discounted as negligible. At the same time, liberty 
may be so constrained in the spheres of economic exchange, social 
intercourse, and political participation that the status of the person or 
group becomes derided as marginal.27 
The ideology-driven white racial violence of the 1950s and 1960s, 
coupled with the repressive regulation of Jim Crow laws, inflicted 
widespread damage on black communities throughout the South.28 
The damage exceeded simple injury and death to exact both dignitary 
and stigma harm. Rationalized by habits of discourse and reinforced 
by the force of law and vigilante violence, the harm belittled black 
racial dignity, negating the integrity of individual citizens and the 
value of whole communities. Deemed naturally or necessarily sub­
ordinate in commerce, culture, and civic governance, the same harm 
cabined black liberty, relegating black citizens to the status of eco­
nomic marginality, social inferiority, and political disenfranchisement. 
The resurgent prosecution of crimes of racial violence committed 
nearly a half century ago affords an occasion to reconsider the opera­
tion of the criminal-justice system in repairing the degradation of 
black dignitary and liberty interests. Reconsideration entails the appli­
cation of a retrospective and contextual ethical valence, a valence that 
shifts backward and forward to explain prosecutorial inaction or 
27. See JOEL F. HANDLER, LA w AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY (1990); William 
H. Simon, Three Limitations of Deliberative Democracy: Identity Politics, Bad Faith, and In­
determinacy, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 
49 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999) [hereinafter DELIBERATIVE POLITICS]; Iris Marion Young, 
Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, in DEBATING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
102 (James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds., 2003); Iris Marion Young, Difference as a Re­
source for Democratic Communication, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON 
REASON AND POLITICS 383 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1 997); Iris Marion 
Young, Justice, Inclusion, and Deliberative Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS, supra, 
at 151. 
28. See JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN 
MISSISSIPPI (1994); ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, BETTER DAY COMING: BLACKS AND EQUALITY, 
1890-2000 (2001); HARVARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY 1954-1980 
( 1981). 
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failure when crimes of racial violence go unpunished and to justify 
prosecutorial action when such crimes undergo penalty. It is precisely 
this search for justification that drives the present inquiry. 
At first blush, justification for the resurgent prosecution of cases of 
white-on-black racial violence years after their disparate criminal acts 
and their subsequently aborted or failed trials seems apparent. It is a 
justification rooted in the regularly intoned belief in a protean politics 
of race. Applicable to both southern and northern precincts, this vague 
incantation suggests that accumulated decades of emancipatory 
changes in American culture and society, joined by coextensive 
transformations in politics and economics, gradually liberated prose­
cutors to renew their campaign against racially motivated violence. 
Put aside for the moment that the historical record furnishes scant 
evidence of a prosecutor-mounted anti-terror campaign.29 In fact, 
taken as a whole, the cases discussed here display small semblance of 
cohesion or organization. Scattered across numerous states and varied 
factual landscapes, they resemble the diffuse product of ad hoc deci­
sionmaking, rather than the regimented logic of an egalitarian crusade. 
Despite this erratic record and the ambiguity of redemption, the 
politics of race theorem casts prosecutors not only as redeemers, but 
also as prisoners. Imprisoned by history, their revelation to take up the 
cause of freedom comes late. History, however, is a multifarious 
warden. It dictates through state functionaries, among them legisla­
tors, judges, administrators, and sheriffs. It disciplines through evolv­
ing cultural and social mores. 
Casting prosecutors as captive cultural and social artifacts or 
reflexive state instruments is troubling. Even at a glance, the account 
seems deterministic. It supplies crude treatments of agency and causa­
tion. More disquieting, the account seems tied by a strand of legal 
nihilism. It denigrates the role of law, professional norms, and legal 
ethics in guiding the prosecution function. Neither of these observa­
tions is meant to deny the force of culture and society or the power of 
the political arm of the state to twist prosecutorial decisionmaking. 
But no ideology banishes choice. And no state, acting through the 
delegated powers of legislatures, courts, and enforcement agencies, is 
omnipotent. Both impress freedom and constraint on the office of the 
prosecutor. 
Mired in liberalism and its heralded autonomy of law, this Essay 
rejects an untrammeled politics of race justification for the resurgent 
29. See ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE 
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 43-44, 101-
13 (1985); BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND 
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1997); ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE 
AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950 (1980); Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and 
the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 39-
42 (1996). 
1 152 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:1141 
prosecution of white-on-black racial violence. In fairness, the rejection 
is only partial. It acknowledges the influence of culture, society, and 
political economy on the prosecutor's station. Furthermore, it admits 
the potency of the state's grip on that station. Nonetheless, it balks at 
the suggestion that law and the norms of the profession hold no sway 
over the discharge of the prosecutor's duties. The duties may be 
circumscribed and the norms corrupted, yet they enter into the daily 
calculus of prosecutorial discretion in race cases. The task is to 
ascertain the capacity of such norms, and their corresponding ethical 
precepts, to infiltrate the race-besieged consciousness of prosecutors 
at the midpoint and at the turn of the century. The path into lawyer 
consciousness leads to discretion. Here, that path is bordered by color. 
The idea of color pervades American law and the criminal-justice 
system. It suffuses advocacy and adjudication as well as legislation and 
law enforcement. Its boundary lines shift, sometimes detectable, some­
times coded. The notion of colorblind representation resonates deeply 
in the process-oriented constitutional jurisprudence of the criminal 
law,30 appealing to a sense of neutrality, procedural fairness, and even­
handed justice.31 The notion of color-coded representation, in 
comparison, evokes an instrumental, result-oriented jurisprudence of 
subterfuge, entailing covert stratagem, veiled motive, and pretext.32 By 
contrast, the notion of color-conscious representation invokes a 
remedial, egalitarian jurisprudence of restoration and reparation, 
broadly applicable to the fields of education,33 employment,34 and 
30. See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992). For a critique of 
colorblind neutrality, see MATTHEW B. ROBINSON, JUSTICE BLIND: IDEALS AND REALITIES 
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2002), and Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of 
the law: How "Color Blindness" Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 77 (2000). 
31. On procedural fairness as justice, see JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS (Samuel 
Freeman ed., 1999); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., 
2001), and JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed., 1999). 
32. See BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT Now I SEE: WHITE RACE 
CONSCIOUSNESS & THE LAW (1998); Peggy c. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 y ALE L.J. 
1559 (1989); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1 161 
(1995); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001). 
33. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanie, California's Racial History and Constitutional 
Rationales for Race-Conscious Decision Making in Higher Education, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
1521 (2000); Paul Diller, Note, Integration Without Classification: Moving Toward Race­
Neutrality in the Pursuit of Public Elementary am/ Secondary School Diversity, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 1999 (2001). 
34. See John Cocchi Day, Retelling the Story of Affirmative Action: Reflections on a 
Decade of Federal Jurisprudence in the Public Workplace, 89 CAL. L. REV. 59 (2001). 
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voting.35 To better understand the classifications of colored discourse 
in criminal law and advocacy, consider the category of race cases. 
II. RACE CASES 
Race cases provide a categorical site for the intersection of law, 
culture, and society. The current prosecution of decades-old criminal 
and civil rights cases for long-neglected racial wrongs demarcates one 
such site. From an antebellum starting point, the trials preserve ele­
ments of the Middle Passage history of race in the law of slavery. This 
history chronicles the common law of contract, tort, and property, and 
the criminal law of slave codes.36 From a postbellum perspective, the 
trials extend traces of the Reconstruction history of race in the law of 
emancipation. This history records the conjunction of statutory 
freedoms, common-law privileges, and criminal-law proscriptions.37 
Under both antebellum and postbellum regimes, the trials of race 
cases mirror the surrounding culture, politics, and sociology of race. 
Indeed, the law of race is shaped by, and in turn shapes, the culture, 
political economy, and social structure of race. 
A. A Genealogy of Race Cases 
The history of race cases spans more than two centuries of 
American law.38 The task of surveying such wide-ranging cases 
35. See Mark Crain, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Redistricting: An Empirical 
Analysis, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 193 (2001); John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie; Are Ra­
cial Stereotypes Now Acceptable Across the Board or Only When Used in Support of Partisan 
Gerrymanders, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489 (2002). 
36. See ARIELA J. GROSS, DOUBLE CHARACTER: SLAVERY ANO MASTERY IN THE 
ANTEBELLUM SOUTHERN COURTROOM (2000); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in 
the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. 
L. REV. 1724 (2001); Ariela J. Gross, "Like Master, Like Man": Constructing Whiteness in 
the Commercial Law of Slavery, 1800-1861, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 263 (1996); Thomas D. 
Russell, A New Image of the Slave Auction: An Empirical Look at the Role of Law in Slave 
Sales and a Conceptual Reevaluation of Slave Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 473 (1996). 
37. See EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN  
THE 19TH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH (1984); ERIC FONER, NOTHING BUT FREEDOM: 
EMANCIPATION AND ITS LEGACY (1983); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO 
FREEDOM (1967); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The "Law Only as an En­
emy": The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Antebellum 
Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969 (1992); Amy H. Kastely, Out of the White­
ness: On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract 
Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269 (1994); see also Florence Wagman Roisman, The Impact of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 on Racially Discriminatory Donative Transfers, 53 ALA. L. REV. 463 
(2002). 
38. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (4th ed. 2001); 
MICHAEL F. HIGGINBOTHAM, RACE LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND QUESTIONS (2001); 
RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (Juan F. Perea et al. 
eds., 2000). 
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embroils the idea and historiography of race.39 No attempt will be 
made here to settle those controversies or to compile a comprehensive 
catalogue of race cases. However laudable, such endeavors exceed the 
grasp of this Essay. Instead, the idea of race and the history of its 
prosecution will be tapered to reported accounts of black victims of 
white violence during a roughly ten-year period of the mid-twentieth 
century. Earlier periods inform these accounts, notably the colonial,40 
Reconstruction,41 and Jim Crow42 eras. In the same way, antecedent 
cultural and social conditions animate the character of the accounts.43 
The conditions impact upon the gendered and ethnic composition of 
racial identity, the form of racialized narrative, and the racial content 
of crime and criminal justice.44 
Against that backdrop, the inclusion of civil disputes, criminal 
prosecutions, and civil rights proceedings in a catalogue of race cases, 
while appropriate, overtaxes this inquiry. Unsurprisingly, the civil 
cases of paramount interest stem predominantly from nineteenth­
century slave-holding disputes under contract, tort, and property law.45 
39. See CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, RACIAL VIOLENCE ON TRIAL (2001); RACIAL 
CLASSIFICATION AND HISTORY (E. Nathaniel Gates ed., 1997). 
40. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR - RACE AND THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978); ALDEN T. VAUGHAN, 
ROOTS OF AMERICAN RACISM: ESSAYS ON THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 128-74 (1995); 
ALBERT J. VON FRANK, THE TRIALS OF ANTHONY BURNS: FREEDOM AND SLAVERY IN 
EMERSON'S BOSTON ( 1998). 
4 1. See EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER 
RECONSTRUCTION ( 1993); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL 
WAR (1994); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 (1982); see 
also RICHARD PAUL FUKE, IMPERFECT EQUALITY: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE 
CONFINES OF WHITE RACIAL ATTITUDES IN POST-EMANCIPATION MARYLAND (1999); AT 
FREEDOM'S DOOR: AFRICAN AMERICAN FOUNDING FATHERS AND LAWYERS IN 
RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH CAROLINA (James Lowell Underwood & W. Lewis Burke, Jr. 
eds., 2000). 
42. See c. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1966); see also 
STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL (1988); 
Stephen J. Riegel, The Persistent Career of Jim Crow: Lower Federal Courts and the "Sepa­
rate but Equal" Doctrine, 1865-1896, 28 AM. J. LEGAL H IST. 17 (1984). 
43. See FRANKIE Y. BAILEY & ALICE P. GREEN, "LAW NEVER HERE": A SOCIAL 
HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN RESPONSES TO ISSUES OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (1999); 
Ariela Gross, Beyond Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 640 (2001). 
44. See KATHLEEN M. BROWN, GOOD WIVES, NASTY WENCHES, AND ANXIOUS 
PATRIARCHS: GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA ( 1996); CARL 
GUTIERREZ-JONES, CRITICAL RACE NARRATIVES: A STUDY OF RACE, RHETORIC AND 
INJURY (2001 ); RANDALL KENNEDY, NIGGER: THE STRANGE CAREER OF A 
TROUBLESOME WORD (2002); IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO 
FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (2003); ERIC W. RISE, THE MARTINSVILLE SEVEN: RACE, RAPE AND 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT ( 1 995); Randall L. Kennedy, "Nigger!" as a Problem in the Law, 
20(Jl ILL. L. REV. 935. 
45. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS ( 1 975); ORLANDO PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD: CONSEQUENCES OF 
SLAVERY IN Two AMERICAN CENTURIES ( 1998). 
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The disputes determine the meaning of skin color and the norms of 
racial status.46 Contemporary civil and criminal cases equally engage 
color47 and status.48 Civil rights cases, branching out from postbellum 
constitutional amendments and federal statutes, also confront domi­
nant stereotypes and status distinctions.49 
The social construction of color is basic to race-contaminated civil, 
criminal, and civil rights proceedings.50 The process of construction 
occurs through the identity-making discourses of racial difference and 
hierarchy.51 Difference, manifested in identity and culture, provokes 
the separation of division. Preserving the divisions and exclusions of 
hierarchy demands an abiding consciousness of race. Consciousness 
hinges on the reproduction of identity and narrative. 
Stirred by interracial animus, race cases highlight the symbolic 
authority of racial identity and the rhetorical power of racialized 
narratives. Acts of bigotry and violence erupt out of identity distinc­
tions based on status and narrative rationales. The distinctions rest on 
axioms of black moral and cultural inferiority deduced from 
antebellum principles of racial hierarchy as well as ingrained habits of 
subordinating construction.52 The hierarchies depend on dominant and 
subordinate socioeconomic ranking. Race-based status distinctions 
46. See Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nine­
teenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998); see also Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A 
Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705 (2000); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The 
Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000); Judith Kelleher Schafer, "Under the Present 
Mode of Trial, Improper Verdicts Are Very Often Given": Criminal Procedure in the Trials of 
Slaves in Antebellum Louisiana, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 635 (1996). 
47. See K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 CAL. L. REV. 41 
(2000); Julie Novkov, Racial Constructions: The Legal Regulation of Miscegenation in Ala­
bama, 1890-1934, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 225 (2002); see also Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against 
the Stereotype: Lessons From Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1 241 (2002). 
48. See Peter Margulies, Identity on Trial: Subordination, Social Science Evidence, and 
Criminal Defense, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 45 (1998); Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal Defense 
Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1994). 
49. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Federal Enforcement of Civil Rights During the First Re­
construction, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 155 (1995); Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State 
and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 509 (1994); see also Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in 
Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567 (1989). 
50. See A. LEON H IGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND 
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996); IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE 
BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 111 -53 (1996); Ian F. Haney L6pez, The So­
cial Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
5 1. See Robert J. Cottrol, The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberalism, and Cultures 
of Racial Hierarchy and Identity in the Americas, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1 1  (2001); Kim Benita Fu­
rumoto, Boundaries of the Racial State: Two Faces of Racist Exclusion in United States Law, 
17 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85 (2001 ). 
52 See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000); 
STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001 ). 
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and 
hierarchies pervade the laws, legal institutions, and sociolegal relations 
of the criminal-justice system.53 The laws of criminal codes and proce­
dure indulge race.54 The offices of federal and state prosecutors exploit 
it.55 Even the relationships between the prosecutor and victim, and 
conversely, the criminal defender and offender, mull its consequence.56 
Racial identity lies at the core of hierarchies in the laws, institu­
tions, and relations of advocacy and adjudication. Identity is carved 
into seemingly immutable stereotypes.57 In the civil-and-criminal 
justice system, stereotypes warp symbols and skew speech. Advancing 
case-by-case, the stereotypes privilege unequal configurations of 
public and private rights and duties. Accrued over time, they infect 
constitutional interpretation, statutory construction, and common law 
adjudication.58 
S3. On racial hierarchies in the criminal-justice system, see JEROME G. MILLER, 
SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
(1996); KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, 
BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS (1998); 
David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: 
An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1638 (1998); David Cole, Foreword, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A 
Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 10S9, 1074-82 (1999); 
Bernard E. Harcourt, Imagery and Adjudication in the Criminal Law: The Relationship 
Between Images of Criminal Defendants and Ideologies of Criminal Law in So11them 
Antebellum and Motlern Appellate Decisions, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 116S, 1 184-96, 1199-1204, 
120S-46 (199S); and Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, am/ Racial Discrimination: 
A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 12SS (1994). See generally Note, Constitutional Risks to 
Equal Protection in the Criminal Justice System, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2098 (2001); Develop­
ments in the Law - Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472 (1988). 
S4. On racial status distinctions in the criminal law, see Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury 
Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 10S YALE L.J. 677 (199S); Devon 
W. Carbado, (£)racing the Fourth Amemlment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002); Sheri Lynn 
Johnson, The Color of Trllth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
261 (1996); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 
CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, Sl VAND. L. 
REV. 333 (1998); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1283 (199S); and Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth 
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 9S6 (1999). 
SS. On prosecutorial exploitation of race in federal and state forums, see Miller-El v. 
Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1044-4S (2003) (citing statistical and historical evidence of racial 
discrimination in jury selection by Dallas County, Texas, prosecutors, including an office­
wide "culture of discrimination"); and Drew S. Days Ill, Race and the Federal Criminal Jus­
tice System: A Look at the Issue of Selective Proseclltion, 48 ME. L. REV. 180 (1996). 
S6. See Elizabeth L. Earle, Banishing the Thirteenth Jnror: An Approach to the Identifi­
cation of Prosecutorial Racism, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1992); M. Shanara Gilbert, An 
Ounce of Prevention: A Constitutional Prescription for Choice of Venue in Racially Sensitive 
Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 18SS (1993); Andrea D. Lyon, Setting the Record Straight: A 
Proposal for Handling Prosec11torial Appeals to Racial, Ethnic or Gender Prejudice During 
Trial, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 319 (2001 ). 
S7. See Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 137S (1999). 
S8. See MARK CURRIDEN & LEROY PHILLIPS, JR., CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE TURN­
OF-THE-CENTURY LYNCHING THAT LAUNCHED 100 YEARS OF FEDERALISM (1999); Pam-
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The colors of black and white dominate racial stereotypes. Forged 
from antebellum and postbellum categories, the colors erect and 
reproduce a dichotomy of black guilt and white innocence. This 
dichotomy is integral to the narrative form and substance of criminal 
and civil rights disputes.59 It produces false public pronouncements of 
black culpability and hollow proclamations of white virtue. These 
mixed declarations of law and fact carry their own logic and bring 
internal coherence to race cases. 
The law itself maps the initial contours of race cases. Traced here, 
the substantive doctrines of criminal and civil rights law inject race 
into the methods of law enforcement, the strategies of advocacy, and 
the standards of adjudication. Consider, for example, racial profiling60 
and hate crimes.61 Racial profiling affects law enforcement and charg­
ing. Hate crimes impact upon indictment and sentencing. The proce­
dural rules of federal and state practice also interpose race into the 
tactics of advocacy and the iterations of judicial rulings. Consider, for 
instance, the continuing furor over equality interests in criminal pro­
cedure and jury selection. Equality issues vex suppression hearings 
and capital sentencing schemes.62 Equal or fair representation issues 
rankle judges in reviewing jury peremptory challenges.63 
eta S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001 
(1998); William G. Ross, The Constitutional Significance of the Scottsboro Cases, 28 CUMB. 
L. REV. 591 (1997-1998). 
59. On the blacklwhite dichotomy in criminal and civil rights narratives, see RICHARD 
DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE 
164-89 (1995); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 
1611, 1616-51 (1985); and Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence 
and Black Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1990). See also PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, 
THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991 ). 
60. See Brandon Garrett, Standing While Black: Distinguishing Lyons in Racial Profiling 
Cases, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1815 (2000); Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial 
Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689 (2000); Samuel R. Gross & 
Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (2002); Gregory 
M. Lipper, Racial Profiling, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 551 (2001); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With 
an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Pro­
filing, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409 (2000). 
61. See JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND 
HATE CRIMES (2002); JAMES B.  JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTIER, H ATES CRIMES: CRIMINAL 
LAW & IDENTITY POLITICS (1998); VALERIE JENNESS, MAKINO HATE A CRIME: FROM 
SOCIAL MOVEMENT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT (2001 ); BARBARA PERRY, IN THE NAME OF 
HATE: UNDERSTANDING HATE CRIMES (2001); see also Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate 
Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal Enforcement, 80 B.U. L. 
REV. 1227 (2000). 
62. See Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedures: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359 (2001); 
Lewis R. Katz, Mapp After Forty Years: Its Impact on Race in America, 52 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 471, (2001). 
63. See Samuel R. Gross, Race, Peremptories, and Capital Jury Deliberations, 3 U. PA. J .  
CONST. L. 283 (2001); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A 
Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809 (1997); see also Robin Charlow, Tolerating 
Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9, 21-27, 31-40 (1997); Susan 
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The race of judges and the racial composition of juries also demar­
cate race cases. For judges, racial biography may sway findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in formalist and instrumental directions, as 
demonstrated in slave code and civil rights enforcement.64 For juries, 
racial biography may tilt evidentiary weighing and legal deliberation, 
as shown in jury nullification.65 Race-tainted cognitive prisms may 
afflict parties, victims, and lawyers as well. The racial identity of 
parties rouses client-lawyer and client-community tensions.66 Victim 
identity induces strain over prosecutorial abuse and bias, as seen in 
protests about revictimization, victims' rights, and victim impact 
statements.67 Lawyer-racial identity, as counsel and as adversary,68 also 
mediates criminal and civil rights cases, as the divergent history of the 
profession and the black bar prove.69 Taken together, these markings 
indicate the external form and internal structure of race cases.70 
N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, Colorblindness, 
and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807 (1993); Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture 
(Not to Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21 (1993); Kenneth J. 
Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Chal­
lenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1996). 
64. See J.W. PELTASON, 58 LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JuDGES AND SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION (1978); LINN WASHINGTON, BLACK JUDGES ON JUSTICE (1994); Derrick 
A. Bell, Jr., Civil Rights Lawyers on the Bench, 91 YALE L.J. 814 (1982) (reviewing JACK 
BASS: UNLIKELY HEROES (1981)); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, 
Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95 (1997). 
65. See Long X. Do, Jury Nullification and Race-Conscious Reasonable Doubt: Overlap­
ping Reifications of Commonsense Justice and the Potential Voir Dire Mistake, 47 UCLA L. 
REV. 1843 (2000); Simon Stern, Note, Between Local Knowledge and National Politics: De­
bating Rationales for Jury Nullification After Bushell's Case, 111 YALE L.J. 1815 (2001); see 
also Walter Rugaber, Trial of 18 Charged with Conspiracy in Mississippi Goes to All-White 
Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1967, at 37. 
66. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests 
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 482-93 (1976); Clark D. Cunningham, 
The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Dis­
course, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: 
Thinking About Law As Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); Herbert A. Eastman, 
Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE LJ. 763 (1995). 
67. See Katie Long, Community Input at Sentencing: Victim's Right or Victim's Re­
venge?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 187 (1995); Walker A. Matthews, III, Proposed Victims' Rights 
Amendment: Ethical Considerations for the Prudent Prosecutor, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
735 (1998); Uli Orth, Secondary Victimization of Crime Victims by Criminal Proceedings, 15 
SOC. JUST. RES. 313 (2002). 
68. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Telling Stories and Stories About Them, 1 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 9 (1994); Margaret M. Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black Attorneys 
and the Straitjacket of Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 766 (1997); David B. Wilkins, Identi­
ties and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502 
(1998); David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer 
Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030 (1995); see also Bernie D. Jones, 
Critical Race Theory: New Strategies for Civil Rights in the New Millennium, 18 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER L.J. 1 (2002); Elaine R. Jones & Jaribu Hill, Contemporary Civil Rights 
Struggle: The Role of Black Attorneys, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 185 (1999-2000). 
69. See J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER 
1844-1944, at 541-610 (1993); Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early 
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B. The Reprosecution of Race Cases 
The race cases in this preliminary study are culled fr<;>m a score of 
criminal and civil rights proceedings in both northern and southern 
courts. For the northern states - Indiana and Pennsylvania - the 
cases arose late in the history of black industrial migration.71 Fot the 
southern states - Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi - the cases 
emerged during the middle period of the evolution of the New South.72 
Like earlier postbellum incidents of lynching,73 many of the cases grew 
out of vigilante forms of private violence variously aided or condoned 
by state agents. Precipitated by virulent opposition to the civil rights 
movement, the cases often attracted national attention.74 
The violence engulfing the civil rights movement and spawning the 
proceedings at issue here illustrates the· historical bonds of race, law, 
and community. Those bonds are forged in the trial and retrial of race 
cases under the aegis of prosecutorial discretion. In the criminal­
justice system, both easy and hard cases are products of discretion. 
Although bounded by Jim Crow laws and customs (all-white juries 
and witness reprisals), the cases are manufactured from familiar mate­
rials: physical evidence and witness testimony of white-on-black vio­
lence. Easy cases rediscover omitted and suppressed evidentiary mate­
rials. Hard cases reweigh neglected criminal-justice norms in parsing 
extant evidence. For examples of evidence-driven easy cases, consider 
the histories of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing, Medgar 
Evers, Vernon Dahmer, Carol Jenkins, and Lillie Belle Allen. 
Turn first to the 1963 bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist 
Church in Birmingham, Alabama.75 On Sunday morning, September 
NAA CP (1910-1920), 20 LAW & HIST. REV. IJ7 (2002); David B. Wilkins, Comment, Class 
Not Race in Legal Ethics: Or Why Hierarchy Makes Strange Bedfellows, 20 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 147 (2002). 
70. For an initial mapping of race case genealogy, see Alfieri, Race Trials, supra note 1,  
at 1305-23. 
71. See NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION 
AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA (1991). 
72. See C. VANN WOODWARD, 0RIGINS OFTHE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913 (1951). 
73. See W. FrrzHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND 
VIRGINIA, 1880-1930 (1993); PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE 
LYNCHING OF BLACK AMERICA (2002); STEWART E. TOLNA Y & E.M. BECK, A FEsTIVAL 
OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882-1930 (1995); GEORGE C. 
WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY 1865-1940: LYNCHINGS, MOB RULE, AND 
"LEGAL LYNCHINGS" (1990). 
74. See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL 
VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH (1987); Michal R. 
Belknap, The Vindication of Burke Marshall: The Southern Legal System and the Anti-Civil 
Rights Violence of the 1960s, 33 EMORY L.J. 93 (1984). 
75. See DIANE MCWHORTER, CARRY ME HOME: BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA - THE 
CLIMACTIC BATTLE OF THE ClvIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2001 ). 
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15, 1963, a bomb exploded in the basement of the Sixteenth Street 
Baptist Church, killing four children, ages eleven to fourteen: Denise 
McNair, Carole Robertson, Cynthia Wesley, and Addie Mae Collins. 
Hindered by the FBI, state and federal prosecutors failed to marshal 
indictments. In 1971, Alabama prosecutors reopened the case and in 
1977 indicted Klansman Robert E. Chambliss, citing the inculpatory 
testimony of Chambliss's niece. An Alabama court convicted 
Chambliss and sentenced him to prison where he died in 1985.76 In 
1995, at the urging of the Birmingham-black community, the FBI 
reopened its controversial investigation. In 2000, state and federal 
prosecutors indicted Klansmen Thomas E. Blanton, Jr. and Bobby 
Frank Cherry.77  Alabama courts held Cherry mentally incompetent to 
stand trial but convicted Blanton of first-degree murder.78 
Similarly, consider the 1963 murder of Medgar Evers, a thirty­
seven-year-old NAACP Field Secretary, in Belzoni, Mississippi. On 
the night of June 12, 1963, Evers was shot in the back outside his 
home. Mississippi prosecutors indicted Klansman Byron De La 
Beckwith for the murder. Two 1964 trials ended in mistrials. In 1990, 
upon public disclosure of suspected jury tampering gleaned from 
Mississippi Sovereignty Commission records, prosecutors reindicted 
Beckwith. The trial court convicted Beckwith; he died in prison.79 
76. See Drummond Ayres Jr., 'Amens' at Church in Birmingham Are Loud After 
Bombing Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1977, at 24; Wayne King, Indictments Recall Terror 
of Birmingham Sunday in 1963, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1977, at 18; Alabama Does Right by 
Martyrs, HARTFORD COURANT, May 6, 2001, at C2; Ex-Klansman Indicted in '63 Bombing 
That Killed 4, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1977, at 20; FBI Agents Honored for Helping Solve 1963 
Church Bomb Case, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at Al9. 
77. See Marlon Manuel, Church Bombing Trial Aims for Healing: Progressive Prosecu­
tor, Nagging Consciences and New Power Structures Try to Make Up for Decades of Delays, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 23, 2001, at Al; Marlon Manuel, Church Bombing Trial 'Worth 
the Wait', ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 23, 2001, at A6; Janita Poe, Birmingham Bombing Vic­
tims: Church Bomber Guilty, at Last, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 23, 2002, at Al; Janita Poe, 
Revisiting 'Bombingham'; Birmingham Aims Marketing Campaign Within City Limits as 39-
year-old Trial Reawakens Lingering Doubts, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 11, 2002, at Al 
[hereinafter Poe, Revisiting 'Bombingham']; Tatsha Robertson, Righting Our Uncivilized 
Wrongs: Reopened Race Murder Cases May Yet Add Justice to an Era, BOSTON GLOBE, May 
6, 2001,  at El; Kevin Sack, An Alabama Prosecutor Confronts the Burden of History, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 5, 2001, at AS; Cynthia Tucker, In Birmingham, Justice ls Late for Four Little. 
Girls, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 21, 2000, at BS. 
78. See Marlon Manuel, Church Bombing Verdict: Justice Served, FBI Man Says; Ex­
Klansman Guilty in 37-year-old Case, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 2, 2001, at lA; Poe, Revis­
iting 'Bombingham,'  supra note 77; Howell Raines, The Birmingham Bombing, N.Y. IlMES, 
July 24, 1983, §6 (Magazine), at 12; Stephanie Saul, FBI Outreach Led to Bombing Arrests, 
NEWSDA y' May 19, 2000, at A6. 
79. See BOBBY DELAUGIITER, NEVER Too LATE: "A PROSECUTOR'S STORY OF 
JUSTICE IN THE MEDGAR EVERS CASE (2001); MARYANNE VOLLERS, GHOSTS OF 
MISSISSIPPI: THE MURDER OF MEDGAR EVERS, THE TRIALS OF BYRON DE LA BECKWITH, 
AND THE HAUNTING OF THE NEW SOUTH (1995); Todd Taylor, Exorcising the Ghosts of a 
Shameful Past: The Third Trial and Conviction of Byron De La Beckwith, 16 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 359 (1996) (reviewing VOLLERS, supra); Christina Cheakalos, Around the 
South: No Big Breaks in Old Racial Slayings: Beckwith Case Seen as a Rarity, ATLANTA J.-
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Likewise, consider the 1966 murder of Vernon Dahmer, a grocery 
store owner and the President of the Harrisburg, Mississippi, NAACP. 
On January 10, 1 966, Klansmen firebombed Dahmer's house at night. 
He died of smoke inhalation after exchanging gunfire with Klansmen, 
enabling his family to escape. Mississippi prosecutors indicted 
Klansman Sam Bowers for the murder. At trial, Mississippi juries 
twice acquitted Bowers. Prosecutors also indicted William Smith for 
the murder. Smith's first state trial ended in a hung jury amid charges 
of jury tampering. A second state trial court convicted Smith and 
sentenced him to prison. In 1998, again following public disclosure of 
Mississippi Sovereignty Commission evidence, prosecutors reindicted 
Bowers. A third Mississippi trial court convicted Bowers and sen­
tenced him to life imprisonment.80 
Further, consider the 1968 murder of Carol Jenkins, a twenty-one­
year-old aspiring model, in Martinsville, Indiana. On September 16, 
1968, Jenkins was stabbed to death while selling encyclopedias door­
to-door. An Indiana police investigation failed to name a suspect or 
make an arrest. On May 8, 2002, based on new evidence supplied by a 
child eyewitness, state prosecutors indicted Kenneth Clay Richmond 
for murder. Indiana courts held Richmond incompetent to stand trial; 
he died in jail.81 
CONST., Feb. 10, 1994, at A3; Willa J. Conrad, One Man's Stand: Medgar Evers' [sic) Hero­
ism Unleashes a Composer's Imagination, STAR-LEDGER (New Jersey), Mar. 4, 2002, at 21; 
Anne �ochell Konigsmark, Civil Wrongs; Pressure Builds to Reopen the Unsolved Murders 
of Rights Activists in I960s, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 21, 1999, at Ml ; Adam Nossiter, As 
South Changes, Civil Rights Murders Being Probed Anew: Thirst for Justice Can 't Be Buried 
by the Decades, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 19, 1989, at Dl; Adam Nossiter, 27 Years 
Later, Evers Slaying Gets Another Look, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 15, 1990, at A3; John 
Shearer, Civil Rights Era Cases Endure; As Prosecutors Pursue Justice Decades Later, the 
Wife of a Man Convicted for a Notorious Crime 1963 Murder Calls Him Innocent, ATLANTA 
J.-CONST., Sept. 7, 2000, at Cl; Editorials: South Atoning for Racist Murders, ATLANTA J.­
CONST., Nov. 10, 1999, at A18; see also De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 554-65 
(Miss. 1997). 
80. See John Gibeaut, Confronting a Dark Past, 84 A.B.A. J., June 1998, at 26; J. Whyatt 
Mondesire, Felon Disenfranchisement: The Modern Day Poll Tax, 10 TEMP. POL. & Civ. 
RTS. L. REV. 435, 440-41 (2001); Rick Bragg, Jurors Convict Former Wizard in Klan Murder, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1998, at Al; Jerry Mitchell, Evers Case Opened Doors, CLARION· 
LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), May 26, 2002, at Al; Earnest Reese, Prosecutors to Re-Examine 
Activist's Slaying; Klan Implicated: The Slaying of Vernon Dahmer in Mississippi 29 Years 
Ago Brought Four Convictions, But Some Say More Needs to Be Done, ATLANTA J.-CONST., 
Apr. 9, 1995, at A3; Anne Rochell, Racial Slaying: New Trial Reopens Bitter Era, ATLANTA 
J.-CONST., Aug. 17, 1998, at Al; Peter Scott & Andy Miller, A Beginning: Racist Killings Re­
opened: New Probes Spark Hopes for Justice, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 3, 1991, at Al6; 
Alan Sverdlik, Activist's Family Renews Call for Trials: Vernon Dahmer Was Killed in 1966, 
But His Case Isn't Dead, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 1, 1995, at B5; see also Rick Bragg, 
Memories of a Deadly Assault in 1 996 Are Reawakened at Klan Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 
1998, at Al6; Mike Williams, Focus on Sovereignty Commission: Files Might Provide Some 
Peace, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 18, 1998, at B2. 
81. See Dick Kaukas, S. Indiana City's Residents Want Racist Image Relegated to Past, 
COURIER J. (Louisville), July 1 ,  2002, at Al; Mike Ellis, Decades-Old Case Challenges Sys­
tem, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 28, 2002, at Al; Sharon Jenkins & Anare V. Holmes, Justice 
for Carol Jenkins, a Human Being: Martyred Girl Touched Thousands of Lives, 
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Finally, consider the 1969 murder of Lillie Belle Allen, a twenty­
seven-year-old mother of two children, in York, Pennsylvania. On July 
21, 1969, armed white-gang members shot Allen when her car stalled 
in a white neighborhood during a race riot. York police officers failed 
to conduct a thorough investigation or survey eyewitnesses. Decades 
later, officers pursuing a related investigation discovered overlooked 
witness testimony and forensic evidence. On that evidence, 
Pennsylvania prosecutors indicted ten white gang members; nine have 
received sentences - seven under plea agreements.82 
Admittedly abridged, these five case histories highlight the 
evidence-specific quality of easy cases in the reprosecution of race 
trials. That quality, however, is misleading. Indeed, to mention the 
relevance of suppressed FBI reports and government documents, or to 
cite omitted eyewitness testimony and forensic findings, obscures a 
more basic normative point. Plainly, such evidentiary material is rele­
vant to the prosecution or reprosecution of race cases. But deploying 
that material to advance the remedial purposes of reprosecution is a 
normative undertaking. Prosecutorial discretion in reprosecuting race 
cases is precisely such an undertaking. It is the normative threshold of 
race case reprosecutions: hard and easy. Exercising the required 
judgment entailed in crossing the threshold may undermine the dis­
tinction posed here. Easy cases in fact may prove to be a kind of 
stalking horse. Their pursuit seems to collapse into the same judg­
ments demanded of hard cases. Put differently, to the extent that all 
race cases involve a crucible of judgment, easy cases may be distin­
guished chiefly by their post hoc rationale: old evidence newly discov­
ered. For examples of more generalizable, norm-driven hard cases, 
INDIANAPOLIS RECORDER, June 7, 2002, at Al; Don Terry, 34 Years Later, Sad Secret Sur­
faces; Childhood Memory May Solve Slaying, CHI. TRIB., May, 12, 2002, at 1; Seeking Justice, 
Decades Later, HARTFORD COURANT, May 20, 2002, at A6; cf. Bruce C. Smith, Murder Sus­
pect Dies of Cancer, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 1 ,  2002, at A1 (noting that Richmond died 
in a state mental-health facility). 
S2. See Russ Crenshaw, Search for Hope Continues in York 25 Years After Violence of 
1969: The Riots Ripped the City Apart. In Some Places, the Wounds Remain Open, YORK 
DAILY RECORD, Aug. 4, 1994, at Al; Rick Lee & Teresa Ann Boeckel, Slick Sent to Prison: 
He Was the Ninth Man Sentenced in the 1969 Killing of Lillie Belle Allen, YORK DAILY REC., 
May 29, 2003, at AS; Marc Levy, Man Pleads Guilty in 1969 Killing: It's 6th Plea Bargain in 
Pa. Race-Riot Slaying of Black Woman, 27, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 30, 2002, at Al4; 
Jim Lynch et al., Verdict Writes History: Jurors' Decision Brings the County's Most Famous 
Case Since the Hex Trial to an End, YORK DAILY REC., Oct. 21, 2002, at All; Timothy D. 
May, City Faces Racial Killings 3 Decades Later, TIMES UNION (Albany), Sept. 24, 2000, at 
A25; Timothy D. May, Pennsylvania City Confronts 2 Racial Killings 31 Years Later Justice: 
A Mob Killed a Black Woman Days After a White Policeman was Slain in York. No One Was 
Ever Charged in Either Death, But Cases Are Being Reopened, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1,  2000, at 
A3; Background: Race Riots, '68 and '69, YORK DAILY REC., Sept. 26, 2000, at A7; Four 
Admit Guilt in '69 York Race Killings, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 15, 2002, at 9; Guilty Pleas 
Begin a Time of Healing: The Book on the 1969 Riots Can Begin to Close, as Four Men did 
the Right Thing by Admilling Guilt, YORK DAILY REC., Aug. JS, 2002, at 2; Opinion: Murder 
Case Full of Choices, YORK DAILY REC., Dec. 20, 2001, at AS. 
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consider the histories of Harry and Harriet Moore; Willie Edwards, 
Jr.; the Bethel Baptist Church bombing; Michael Schwemer, Andrew 
Goodman, and James Chaney; Oneal Moore; Ben Brown; Ben Ches­
ter White; Rainey Pool; Henry Hezekiah Dee and Charles Eddie 
Moore; and Wharlest Jackson. 
Turn first to the earliest of these cases, the 1951 murders of Harry 
and Harriette Moore in Mims, Florida. On December 25, 1951, a 
bomb exploded under the bedroom of the Moore's small wood frame 
house, killing Harry, a NAACP activist, and gravely injuring 
Harriette, who died eight days later. An FBI investigation of the Klan 
in Orange County, Florida, and a 1952 federal grand jury in Miami 
produced perjury indictments in 1953 but no arrests. Florida officials 
subsequently reopened the investigation in 1978 and 1991, finally 
closing the case in April 1992 for lack of evidence.83 
Tum next to the 1957 murder of Willie Edwards, Jr., a twenty-five­
year-old black truck driver in Montgomery, Alabama. Edwards failed 
to return home from work on January 23, 1957. In April of 1957, 
fishermen found Edwards's decomposed body in the. Alabama River. 
Notwithstanding suspicions of a Ku Klux Klan abduction, state 
officials ruled the death an accident by drowning because of insuffi­
cient evidence. In 1976, the state attorney general opened a homicide 
investigation and indicted three Montgomery Klansmen for murder: 
William Kyle Livingston, Jr. , Henry Alexander, and James York. The 
indictment accused the Klansmen of forcing Edwards to leap to his 
death from the Tyler Goodwin Bridge on January 23, 1957 for 
allegedly making advances toward a white woman. Despite Britt's 
grand jury testimony, bargained in exchange for immunity, an 
Alabama court twice dismissed the indictment for lack of a specific 
cause of death. In 1992, near death, Alexander confessed to the 
murder. Pressed by the Edwards family to reopen the investigation, in 
1997 prosecutors exhumed Edwards's body, officially ruled his death a 
homicide, and reconvened a grand jury to seek a second murder 
indictment. In 1999, the grand jury failed to return an indictment.84 
83. See BEN GREEN, BEFORE HIS TIME: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HARRY T. MOORE, 
AMERICA'S FIRST CIVIL RIGHTS MARTYR (1999); Philip Morgan, The Martyr, TAMPA 
TRIB., Nov. 5, 2000, at 1; Ormund Powers, Book Revives Debate About Fatal Christmas 1951 
Bombing, LAKE TRIB., May 19, 1999, at 3; Harry Wessel, Civil Rights Leader Gets His Due, 
ORLANDO SENTINELTRIB., Aug. l, 1999, at F-7 (reviewing GREEN, supra); Healing Old 
Wounds, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 15, 1999, at Al4; PBS, Freedom Never Dies: The 
Legacy of Harry T. Moore - Florida Terror - Who Killed Harry T. Moore, at http://www. 
pbs.org/harryrnoore/terror/who.html (last visited July 30, 2003). 
84. See Ray Jenkins, Alabama Slaying Laid to Klansmen; Former Member Testifies 
Against Others Accused in Montgomery Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1976, at 13; Adam 
Nossiter, Widow Inherits a Confession to a 36-Year-Old Hate Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 
1993, at A5; Alabama Witness of Alleged Slaying Admits an Error, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1976, 
at 17; 3 Named as Klan Members Plead Not Guilty in Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1976, at 
18; 3 Whites Indicted in '57 Black Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1976, at 38; see also John Ze­
nor, Unresolved Death Casts Long Shadow: Despite a Deathbed Confession by One Suspect 
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More forcefully, compare the June 29, 1958 bombing of the Bethel 
Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama. Initially, Alabama prosecu­
tors offered no indictments. Twenty years later in 1977, prosecutors 
indicted white supremacist J. B. Stoner. Alabama state courts 
extradited Stoner, convicted him, and sentenced him to ten years.85 
Turn as well to the 1964 murder of civil rights workers Michael 
Schwerner, Andrew Goodman, and James Chaney in Mississippi. The 
June 21, 1964 abduction and shooting of the three men resulted in the 
FBI arrest of twenty-one Klansmen. When local and state prosecutors 
refused to act, federal prosecutors indicted nineteen of the Klansmen 
on conspiracy charges. Despite three mistrials, Mississippi courts 
convicted only seven Klansmen. Recently, the FBI opened 40,000 
pages of investigative files on the murders, sparking calls for renewed 
prosecution.86 
Comparable calls mark the 1965 murder of Oneal Moore, a thirty­
four-year-old black Washington Parish Sheriff Deputy, in Varnado, 
Louisiana. On June 2, 1965, Moore was shot and killed in a midnight 
ambush while on patrol. Mississippi police arrested Klansman Ray 
McElveen. Louisiana prosecutors extradited McElveen and indicted 
him for murder but released him within weeks for insufficient 
evidence and dropped all charges. The FBI reopened the case in the 
1980s, posting a $40,000 reward on January 16, 2002.87 
and the Cooperation of Another, an Alabama Man's Family is Waiting for Justice 42 Years 
later, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 4, 1999, at AJO; FBI Wants To Know If It Helped Klans­
man Dodge Murder Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1993, at A13. 
85. See Conviction in Bombing in Alabama ls Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1982, at 8; 
Segregationist Gives Up To Serve Bombing Term, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1983, at A16; Segre­
gationist Stoner ls Convicted in '58 Bombing and Gets JO Years, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1980, at 
A20; U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Conviction of White Racist, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1985, at 
23. 
86. See Ben Chaney, Schwerner, Chaney and Goodman: The Struggle for Justice, 27 
HUM. RTS. Spring 2000, at 3; see also Kathleen Kenna, Racing Time: State that Once Shielded 
the Klan ls Determined To Put It on Trial Before the Last Witnesses Die, TORONTO STAR, 
Aug. 27, 2000, at Bl; Walter Rugaber, Mississippi Jury Convicts 7 of 18 in Rights Killings, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1967, at 1; Emily Wagster, Next Old Civil Rights Case May Be 'Missis­
sippi Burning' Murders, LETHBRIDGE HERALD, May 3, 2001, at Al3. 
Consider also the July 14, 1964 murder of Henry Hezekiah Dee, a twenty-year-old saw­
mill worker, and Charles Eddie Moore, a twenty-year-old college student, in Tallulah, Lou­
isiana. Both Dee and Moore vanished on May 2, 1964, though neither was active in the civil 
rights movement. A search party found their bodies in a nearby river. In November of 1964, 
FBI and state officials arrested two Mississippi Klansmen, Charles M. Edwards and James 
Ford Seale, on murder charges. State prosecutors dismissed the charges without convening a 
grand jury. In 2002, Mississippi prosecutors and police officials, together with the FBI, 
reopened the case for active investigation. See John Herbers, White Man Linked to Slain 
Negroes: Alleged Klansman ls Said to Have Admitted Beating of 2 Men Found Dead, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 15, 1966, at 1; Whites Freed in Slayings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1965, at 18; 2 Whites 
Seized in Negro Slayings: Mississippians Accused of Shooting 2 Hitchhikers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 7, 1964, at 56; see also Richard A. Serrano, Chasing Justice in the New South: A Brother 
Who Won't Forget, a Prosecutor Who Won't Give Up, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at Al. 
87. See Alison Gerber, Prosecutors Reopening Other Decades-Old Cases of Murder, 
USA TODAY, May 1 8, 2000, at A3; Jerry Mitchell, Federal Trial in '66 Killing Likely, 
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The same calls for reopening attend the . 1967 murder of Ben 
Brown in Jackson, Mississippi. On May 1 1 ,  1967, Brown was shot in 
the back by police officers at a civil rights protest rally. Mississippi 
officials conducted a week-long investigation but declined to make 
arrests. In 1999, the Jackson Police Department established a Cold 
Case Unit to investigate dormant investigations, as yet it has made no 
arrests. Calls to reopen the investigation continue to sound even 
though the two accused officers are dead.88 
Turn more sharply to the 1966 murder of Ben Chester White, a 
sixty-seven-year-old farmhand, in Natchez, Mississippi. On June 10, 
1966, three Klansmen, Ernest Avants, Claude Fuller, and James Jones, 
abducted White, shot him, and dumped his body in Pretty Creek at 
Homochitto National Forest. Mississippi officials arrested all three 
men. State court proceedings ended in a mistrial for Jones and an 
acquittal for Avants. Fuller never stood trial. He and Jones 
subsequently died. In 2000, federal prosecutors indicted A van ts for 
civil rights violations, citing federal jurisdiction over the Homochitto 
National Forest.89 
Last, turn to the 1970 murder of Rainey Pool, a one-armed share­
cropper, in Louise, Mississippi. On April 11 ,  1970, seven white men 
assaulted Pool outside of a Delta nightclub and dumped his body into 
the Sunflower River where he died. Prosecutors obtained multiple 
indictments in 1970 but declined to go forward. In 1998, at the urging 
of Pool's family, prosecutors reopened the case and indicted five of 
the seven surviving men on manslaughter charges: James "Doc" 
Caston, his brother Charles E. Caston and half-brother Hal Spivey 
Crimm, Dennis Newton, and Joe Oliver Watson. At three separate 
trials, state courts acquitted Newton but convicted the Caston brothers 
CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Jan. 9, 2002, at Al; Suzi Parker, In New South, a Bid to 
Redress Old Crimes: Today's Prosecutors Raise the Priority of Unsolved Cases from the Civil 
Rights Era, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 7, 2000, at l ;  Paul Rioux, 1965 Murder of Dep­
uty Gets New Look from FBI: Agents Launch 3rd Try to Solve Racial Killing, Ease Family's 
Pain, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Louisiana), Aug. 17, 2001, at Al; Stephanie Saul, Their Killers 
Walk Free: Because Murder Has No Statute of Limitations, and Political Strength of Black 
Voters is Growing, Some Unsolved Killings of Black Men in the Civil Rights Era are Being 
Revisited, BALT. SUN, Dec. 20, 1998, at Cl; Richard A. Serrano, Chasing Justice in the New 
South: Answers Elusive in 1965 Slaying, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at Al; Ed Timms, A New 
Climate, a New Call for Justice, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 7, 1990, at 22. 
88. See Adam Lynch, Cold Case Unit Reveals Tactics Involving 1967 Shooting, MISS. 
LINK, Feb. 15-21, 2001, at 2. 
89. See Rick Bragg, Last Cry for Justice in Mississippi as U.S. Trial Revisits '66 Killing, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2003, at 1 ;  Jerry Mitchell, Avants' Stroke May Derail Trial: Seventy­
year-old Faces Federal Murder Charge in 1966 Case, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), 
Feb. 12, 2002, at Bl; Alleged Klansman is Freed in Slaying of Negro; Mississippi Had 
Charged That Killing Was Attempt to Lure Dr. King in Murder Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 
1967, at 44; Klansmen Linked to Negro's Death; Co-Defendant Asserts Two Killed Mississip­
pian, 65 N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1966, at 20; 3 Men Held in Mississippi on Charge of Killing 
Negro, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1966, at 13. 
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and Crimm, sentencing each to twenty years in prison. Watson 
pleaded guilty.90 
Albeit truncated, these case histories demonstrate that the 
accepted conception of standard discretion permits prosecutors to 
renew race cases in accord with the ethical and j urisprudential norms 
of the criminal-justice system. Shorn from liberal legalism, those 
norms grant both the independence of lawyers and the autonomy of 
law. They also allow a departure from the colorblind stance of impar­
tiality and neutrality toward race. In so doing, they give latitude to 
color-coded pretext. Infused by racial-status distinctions and stereo­
types, color-coded claims damage the prosecution function as a legal 
process and, thereby, weaken both the professional and institutional 
values of candor, openness, and fairness. Race-conscious discretion 
revives that process, openly conceding the impact of race on lawyer 
cognition, epistemology, and ideology, as well as its influence on 
sociolegal roles, relationships, and institutions. The candid admission 
of race as part of the criminal-justice process leaves race-conscious 
discretion untied to restorative justice communities and redemptive 
forms of advocacy. The next Part contemplates securing those ties in 
the reopening of race cases under the standard ethical conception of 
prosecutorial discretion. 
III. STAN DAR D DISCRETION IN RACE CASES 
The standard ethical conception for the prosecution of criminal 
and civil rights cases rests on discretion. Prosecutorial discretion is 
bound up in law, ethics, and tradition.91 The exercise of discretion 
underlies prosecutorial decisions to commence, decline, and dismiss 
actions in federal and state court. Decisions to abandon and to renew 
race case prosecutions incite speculation about state racism and racial 
hegemony.92 Such speculation provides ample explanation for prosecu-
90. See Caston v. State, 823 So. 2d 473, 479-82, 503 (Miss. 2002). Compare in this respect 
the 1967 murder of Wharlest Jackson, a thirty-seven-year-old NAACP local chapter officer, 
in Natchez, Mississippi. On February 27, 1 967, Jackson was killed by a truck bomb while 
driving home. In spite of a 6,000 page investigative record, the FBI closed the case after the 
statute of limitations on civil rights prosecutions expired. In 1998, the Natchez Board of 
Alderman issued a resolution urging local police officials to reopen the case. A police review 
of the FBI files ensued. See Seth S. King, Slaying Recalls Series of Deaths That Have Marked 
Rights Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1%8, at 24; Anne Rochell Konigsmark, Civil Wrongs: Pres­
sure Builds to Reopen the Unsolved Murders of Rights Activists in 1960s, ATLANTA J.­
CONST., Feb. 21, 1999, at Ml. 
91. See Richard Bloom, Prosecutorial Dlvcretion, 87 GEO. L.J. 1267 ( 1999); Teah R. 
Lupton, Prosecutorial Discretion, 90 GEO. L.J. 1279 (2002); Robert L. Misner, Recasting 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J.  CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996); Roland G. Schroeder, 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 GEO. L.J. 853 (1990). 
92. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Legalization of Racism in a Constitutional State: 
Democracy's Suicide in Vichy France, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1998-1999); Laura Kalman, From 
Slavery to Freedom, 90 GEO. L.J. 16 1  (2001); Mark Tushnet, Constructing Paternalist He-
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torial failure and renewal. But the explanation may prove too much. 
Its logic merges the prosecutor into the machinery of the state and 
immerses professional ideals into racial ideology. That immersion 
erases the independent-ethical role of the prosecutor and his autono­
mous judgment of legality and justice. · 
Independence aside, prosecutorial judgment in race cases is never 
far from bias. Entrenched in the political economy of the state and 
circulating across culture and society, bias seeps into the criminal­
justice system.93 Prosecutors interpose bias94 in the social construction 
of crime.95 Distinct from the overtness of ·de jure discrimination, bias 
emerges at all phases of criminal justice, extending from street-level 
policing to courtroom sentencing.96 Pervasive in its reach, it intersects 
gender and sexuality.97 Throughout these intersections, it combines 
with the intrinsic and extrinsic sources of prosecutorial discretion, par­
ticularly legality and justice. Validated by law and custom, bias sur­
vives the remedial grassroots and legislative efforts of the twentieth­
century civil rights movement.98 
gemony: Gross, Johnson, and Hadden on Slaves and Masters, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 169 
(2002); David Menschel, Note, A bolition Without Deliverance: The Law of Connecticut Slav­
ery 1 784-1848, 111 YALE L.J. 183 (2001). 
93. On the dynamics of bias, see Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding 
of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747 (2001). 
94. On prosecutor bias in the social construction of crime, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Ra­
cial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739 (1993), and Sheri Lynn Johnson, 
Comment, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988). 
See also w. LANCE BENNETI & MARTHA s. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE 
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981). 
95. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT - RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICA (1995); Paul G. Chevigny, From Betrayal to Violence: Dante's Inferno and the So­
cial Construction of Crime, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 787 (2001); Paul Knepper, Race, Ra­
cism and Crime Statistics, 24 S.U. L. REV. 71 {1996). 
96. See Thorne Clark, Protection from Protection: Section 1983 and the ADA 's implica­
tions for Devising a Race-Conscious Police Misconduct Statute, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1585 
(2002); Kathryn Roe Eldridge, Racial Disparities in the Capital System: Invidious or Acci­
dental, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 305 (2002); Marvin D. Free, Jr., Race and Presentencing Decisions in 
the United States: A Summary and Critique of the Research, 27 CRIM. JUST. REV. 203 (2002). 
97. See Serena Mayeri, "A Common Fate of Discrimination": Race-Gender Analogies in 
Legal and Historical Perspective, 1 10 YALE L.J. 1045 (2001); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 
YALE L.J. 769, 875-925 (2002). 
98. See Jack M. Beerman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation: Fifty Years 
Later, 34 CONN. L. REV. 981 (2002); Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of Afri­
can American Fortunes-Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 369 (2002). 
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A. Standard Discretion: Intrinsic Sources 
Standard discretion defines the prosecution function as a means to 
enforce law and to promote j ustice.99 Fastening legality to j ustice 
establishes the moral predicate for the criminal-justice system. 
Moreover, it confirms the logic and legitimacy of that system. 
Abraded by bias, the link between law and j ustice erodes in race cases. 
The sometimes prejudicial interests clamoring for criminal j ustice -
cause-oriented groups, political parties, the media, and the public -
speed that erosion. 
The history, organization, and adversary setting of criminal and 
civil rights prosecutions direct prosecutorial decisionmaking in serving 
the multiple interests of private parties and public agents.100 Critical 
moments of decision come in investigating, charging, and plea 
bargaining.1oi Efforts to guide such discretionary moments by 
prudence, truth, or virtue102 struggle to overcome racial bias.103 
Comparable efforts grounded in administrative, doctrinal, and ethical 
regulation also falter.104 
99. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 6ff7 (1999); Judith L. Maute, "In Pursuit of Justice" in High Profile Criminal Maters, 70 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1745 (2002); Fred. C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial 
Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 YAND. L. REV. 45 (1991). 
100. See Bruce A. Green, The Ethical Prosecutor and the Adversary System, 24 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 126 (1988); David T. Johnson, The Organization of Prosecution and the Possibility of 
Order, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 247 (1998); Kenneth J .  Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an 
Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. Rev. 669 (1992); Alan Vinegrad, The Role of the Prosecutor: 
Serving the Interests of All the People, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 895 (2000); Joan E. Jacoby, The 
American Prosecutor in Historical Context, PROSECUTOR, May/June 1997, at 33. 
101. See ABRAHAM s. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA (1981); Eli Paul Mazur, Rational Expectations of Leni­
ency: Implicit Plea Agreements and the Prosecutor's Role as a Minister of Justice, 51 DUKE 
L.J. 1333 (2002); Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the A utonomy of Prosecutorial 
Charging Decisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion - Knowing There Will Be 
Consequences for Crossing the Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371 (2000); Lisa F. Salvatore, United 
States v. Hammad: Encouraging Ethical Conduct of Prosecutors During Pre-Indictment In­
vestigations, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 577 (1990). 
102. See Darryl K. Brown, What Virtue Ethics Can Do for Criminal Justice: A Reply To 
Huigens, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 29 (2002); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous 
Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197 (1988); Bennett L. Gershman, 
The Prosecutor's Duty to Trlllh, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309 {2001); Leslie C. Griffin, The 
Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J .  LEGAL ETHICS 259 (2001); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good 
Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355 {2001). 
103. See Angela J .  Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998); Tracey L. McCain, The Interplay of Editorial and Prosecu­
torial Discretion in the Perpetuation of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 25 COLUM. J.L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 601 (1992). 
104. See Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An A dministrative 
Law for Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473 (1976); Sheri Lynn John­
son, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court Judges, 73 CHl.-KENT L. REV. 475 (1998); 
Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions, 
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Ethical restraints on bias are thwarted by the enabling discretion of 
law and community.105 Law divulges bias via custom and text. Custom 
permits bias through habits and practices. Texts - constitutional, 
statutory, and common law - authorize bias through their plain 
meaning, legislative history, policy, and precedent. In race cases, 
prosecutors apply constitutional and statutory texts in accord with the 
racial customs of their office and locality. 
Community instills bias by direct and indirect pressure. Direct 
pressure follows from the prosecutorial-appointment process. 
Appointed by election or merit selection, prosecutors periodically 
must offer their policies and records up for popular or state ratifica­
tion. That occasion serves as a kind of public referendum, a plebiscite 
on the juridical rules of race. Indirect pressure flows from cultural and 
social conventions. Cultural conventions embodied in prosecutor 
charging and jury deliberation decide on the suitability of black 
victims for trial and the patience of black communities to endure 
prosecutorial inaction and failure. Matching social conventions decree 
the availability of white offenders for trial and the willingness of white 
communities to accommodate the strife of trial without political inter­
vention. For decades, law and community combined to stifle the 
prosecution of race cases and to quiet outcry when that prosecution 
failed. 
For contemporary prosecutors, especially at the federal level,106 
criminal and civil rights law and community fervor are no longer 
freighted with the same weight of nineteenth-century bias. Less 
encumbered by the racially inflammatory texts of law and the prejudi­
cial onus of cultural and social convention, they enjoy expanded 
discretion under augmented federal criminal laws107 and federal sen-
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511 (2000); N. Douglas Wells, Prosecution as an Administrative Sys­
tem: Some Fairness Concerns, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 841 (1999). 
105. See Peter Krug, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National 
Reports to the XV/th International Congress of Comparative Law: Section V Prosecutorial 
Discretion and its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643 (2002); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint 
of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981); James Vorenberg, Narrowing the 
Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 4 DUKE L.J. 651 (1976). 
106. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, 
55 VAND. L. REV. 381 (2002); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Fed­
eral Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000); see also Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Conse­
quences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming 
Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2002); Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the 
Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553 
(1999). 
107. See AMER. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 32-35 (1998); Steven W. Qymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Crimi­
nal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 675-97 (1997); Symposium, Federalization of Crime: The Role 
of the Federal and State Governments in the Criminal Justice System, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 965 
(1995). 
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tencing guidelines.108 The still developing body of procedural law 
implementing these federal criminal statutes seems similarly 
unhindered by brazenly asserted bias, though controversy afflicts the 
burdens of procedure, specifically the judge-made evidentiary barriers 
to selective prosecution claims.109 Paradoxically, by enlarging the 
prosecutorial range of discretion in case selection, sentencing depar­
tures, and penalty enhancement, these burgeoning statutes offer 
greater opportunity for bias.1 10 
Lacking the civil rights-era insulation afforded by state law 
enforcement officials and the massive resistance of local white 
communities, contemporary prosecutors seem more prone to hear 
complaints of inaction and to suffer the inferences of bias-related 
misconduct. 1 1 1  The constitutional repercussions of misconduct charges 
ignite debate over professional discipline and the abuse of ethical 
rules. 1 12 Now, as before, charges of prosecutorial bias rarely address 
the source of the bias itself. 
Bias originates in community. The cohesion and vitality of 
community hinge on values. Segregated community is founded on the 
values of white superiority and domination. Rooted in segregated 
108. See Cynthia K. Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal 
Prosecutor's Expanding Power Over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 
199 (1997); William J.  Powell & Michael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Fed­
eral Sentencing Guidelines: ls the Fox Guarding the Hen House?, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 373 
(1995); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 
1471 (1993). 
109. See Marc Michael, Note, United States v. Armstrong: Selective Prosecution - A 
Futile Defense and Its Arduous Standard of Discovery, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 675 (1998); 
Tobin Romero, Liberal Discovery on Selective Prosecution Claims: Fulfilling the Promise of 
Equal Justice, 84 GEO. L.J. 2043 (1996). 
1 10. See G. Robert Blakey, Federal Criminal Law: The Need, Not for Revised Constitu· 
tional Theory or New Congressional Statutes, But the Exercise of Responsible Prosecutive 
Discretion, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1 175 (1995); Robert Heller, Comment, Selective Prosecution 
and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prose­
c111orial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1325-44 (1 997); Robert G. Morvillo & Barry A. 
Bohrer, Checking the Balance: Prosecutorial Power in an Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 137 (1995). 
111 .  John M. Burkoff, Prosecutorial Ethics: The Duty Not "To Strike Foul Blows", 53 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 271, 282 (1992); Peter J .  Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Grand Jury In­
vestigations, 51 S.C. L. REV. 1 ,  10-20 (1999); see Andrew M. Hertherington, Prosecutorial 
Misconduct, 90 GEO. L.J. 1679 (2002). 
112. See Jennifer Blair, Comment, The Regulation of Federal Prosecutorial Misconduct 
by State Bar Associations: 28 U.S.C. § 530B and the Reality of Inaction, 49 UCLA L. REV. 
625 (2001); Frank 0. Bowman, I I I ,  A Bludgeon by Any Other Name: The Misuse of " Ethical 
Rules" Against Prosecutors to Control the Law of the State, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 665, 
687-90 (1996); Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 
WASH. U. L.Q. 713 (1999); Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and 
Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 7 1  TEMP. L. REV. 887 (1998); 
Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001); 
see also Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, 
1 13 HARV. L. REV. 2080 (2000). 
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community, both northern and southern prosecutors fell subject to 
white racial ideology. Nothing in the prosecutorial office granted 
immunity from its malevolence. But lack of immunity alone scarcely 
explains prosecutorial inaction and failure in the instant race cases. 
Fuller explanation of prosecutorial breakdown points to the discre­
tionary calculus of instrumental lawyering. 
Instrumental theories animate the prosecution and defense func­
tions. Value-laden in design, instrumental lawyering is purposive. The 
purposes encompass broad and narrow goals. Result-oriented in style, 
such lawyering seeks certain outcomes. The outcomes arise in single 
cases or along a continuum of cases. This consequentialist ethic 
extends to case selection and trial strategy. 
The freedom to exert autonomy in case selection and strategy 
distinguishes prosecutors from other state agents. To borrow from 
William Simon's prior writing on ethical discretion elsewhere in 
lawyering, the freedom to pursue "potentially enforceable legal 
claims" and "to refuse to assist in the pursuit of legally permissible 
courses of action" puts prosecutors at some distance from the state. 1 13 
Distance of this sort is significant. It implies discretion and political 
room to maneuver. Variation in the degree of distance from state 
authority delimits the ambit of discretion available to prosecutors. 
However narrow, that ambit reserves the inchoate redemptive oppor­
tunity to advance legality and justice in the prosecution of race cases. 
The prospect for redemptive prosecution in race cases rises from 
reflection. Prosecutorial discretion carries what Simon calls "a profes­
sional duty of reflective j udgment."114 Reflection involves an assess­
ment of the relative merits of the state's criminal-justice goals and 
claims. For the cases assembled here, the goals include conciliation, 
integration, and segregation. The claims sound colorblind, color­
coded, or color-conscious themes. 
Both state goals and claims entail conflicting considerations of 
criminal justice. The considerations favor different groups and out­
comes. Conciliation goals encourage face-to-face meeting and forgive­
ness. Integration goals promote gradual cooperation and mercy. 
Segregation goals foster separation and reprisal. Tilted toward integra­
tion, colorblind claims grope to obtain incremental changes in inter­
group relations. Covertly joined with racial partition, color-coded 
claims work to preserve unequal relations. Openly revisionist, color­
conscious claims alternately serve to realign and retrench intergroup 
positions. 
Prosecutorial reconciliation of the competing merits of criminal­
j ustice goals and claims requires a sense of legality and j ustice 
1 13. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 
1083 (1988). 
1 14. Id. 
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independent of state sanction. Professional independence from the 
client, the market, and the state comports with Simon's sense of the 
"traditional ambitions of lawyers."1 15  For Simon, realizing that ambi­
tion demands direct-lawyer participation in relevant decisionmaking, 
not unreflective acquiescence to the commands of vigilante mobs or 
partisan officials. Such participation, uninhibited by offender 
bargaining, victim preference, or state prerogative, involves a prosecu­
tor-initiated process of elaborating and implementing norms of 
legality and justice. To be helpful, elaboration must go outside the tra­
ditional law of race and the entailment of de j ure and de facto 
discrimination. Deploying countervailing constitutional, statutory, and 
common law resources, it must aspire to restore community and to 
reconcile conflict. In the same way, implementation must go beyond 
customary-legal remedy to fashion equitable, community-based relief. 
The starting point for the vindication of the norms of legal merit 
and j ustice in race cases is the particularized circumstance of the 
victim, the offender, and their cohort communities. Promoting justice 
in these difficult circumstances urges the embrace of the discretionary 
norms applied in judicial decisionmaking. The analogy to j udicial 
decisionmaking in lawyering is not uncommon. 1 16 Building on this 
analogy, Simon recommends judge-made norms for their analytic 
breadth, flexibility, and complexity.117 
Unlike the instrumentalist emphasis on lawyering goals and claims, 
the formalist style of judicial decisionmaking stresses relative and 
internal merit. Applied to the prosecution of race cases, relative merit 
comprises three measures: law, interest, and equality. The first tests 
the legal underpinnings of prosecutorial goals and claims against 
governing constitutional, statutory, and common law standards in 
search of accord and, when unavailing, reform. The second appraises 
the quality of the public and private interests embedded in prosecuto­
rial goals and claims, a measure that admittedly may prove unquan­
tifiable. The third estimates the remedial impact of asserted prosecu­
torial goals and claims on political and social inequality. Simon refers 
to this impact as a kind of equalization effect, more pertinent to legal 
services access than political or socioeconomic status.1 18 Conceptually, 
it bears noting that equalization possesses enough dexterity to address 
both racial access to justice in law and racial equality in society. 
Unquestionably, Simon's proposed measures of relative merit pose 
difficulties. Law is far too indeterminate and its policies too often 
1 15. Id. at 1 144. 
1 16. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (1993). 
1 17. See Simon, supra note 1 13, at 1090-91. 
118. Id. at 1093. 
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incommensurate to resolve merit by force of will. Even edicts carrying 
the force of law may still not cure ancient nonconformity, as shown in 
the repeated frustration of Reconstruction and post-Brown era statu­
tory and constitutional decrees. Interest analysis is also suspect. Public 
and private interests frequently stand incompatible. State, offender, 
and victim interests similarly diverge. Remedial solutions enamored 
of equality also generate uncertainty. Equality remedies spawn 
incalculable effects, sometimes recasting the very form and substance 
of discrimination, for example in the criminal context of j ury selection 
where tolerance for race-based peremptory challenges continues to 
survive judicial scrutiny.119 Such secondary and often unforeseeable 
effects may contravene the purpose of the remedy itself. 
Faced with compound indeterminacies in assaying the relative 
merit of state criminal-justice goals and claims, prosecutors must turn 
to an inspection of internal merit in race cases. To Simon, internal 
merit dictates an assessment of legal value. This valuation consists of 
three parts.120 The first part evaluates the substance and procedure of 
the appointed goals and claims. The substantive and procedural goals 
of race cases relate to the formal protection and vindication of 
communities of color under criminal and civil rights statutes. The 
second part assesses the purpose and form of state goals and claims. 
The redemptive purposes of race cases fracture upon entering the 
criminal-justice system where adversarial and penal conventions 
thwart restorative-justice goals. The third part contemplates the 
framing of state goals and claims in broad and narrow terms. The 
framing of race cases adverts broadly to black and white community, 
but refers narrowly to the offender and victim. 
Prosecutor appraisal of the relative and internal merit of state 
criminal-justice goals and claims in race cases gathers consequence 
when state decisionmakers in law enforcement locales, legislatures, 
and courts abdicate responsibility for guaranteeing equal protection 
and due process rights to communities of color. In these circum­
stances, as here, state decisionmakers fall unreliable. Doubtless the 
logic of collective action, coupled with federalism and separation of 
powers principles, urges fairly apportioning responsibility to multiple­
state decisionmakers in race cases. Evidence of institutional bias, 
however, behooves prosecutors to lead the decisionmaking process in 
establishing and implementing controverted state goals in race cases. 
Prosecutorial leadership in race cases requires a role-situated 
brand of self-appraisal tailored to the exercise of discretion. To be 
useful, lawyer self-appraisal must set out a manageable and reliable 
decisionmaking procedure. Indicated by Simon, self-appraisal gives 
1 19. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995). 
120. Simon, supra note 1 13, at 1096-109. 
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rise to a heightened duty to assure a sound procedure for the formula­
tion of state criminal-justice goals and claims. Soundness implies effi­
cacy in intervention. Embellishing Simon, this process imperative 
reinforces the prosecutor's ordinary duty to take "reasonably available 
actions to make the procedure as effective as possible and to forgo 
actions that would reduce its efficacy."121 Implying an efficacy princi­
ple militates against prosecutor dissonance and deception in pursuing 
state goals. 
The interventionist duty to formulate a decision procedure 
demands close attention to the purpose and form of prosecution. 
Mainstream purposes well-matched to community wants channel 
prosecutors to abide by formal procedure. Reformist purposes, 
discordant with community desires, leave prosecutors unguided by 
traditional procedure. The burden of unguided discretion accentuates 
the complex procedural j udgments and responsibilities prosecutors 
undertake in assuring substantively valid decisions in race cases. 
Prosecutorial judgments of purpose and form may be aided by 
reframing state criminal-justice goals and claims. Reframing entails 
the deployment of broad and narrow issue templates. Narrow 
templates, Simon explains, define issues "in terms of a small number 
of characteristics of the parties and their dispute," for example, in a 
white-on-black crime of assault or murder.122 Broad templates define 
issues "to encompass the parties' identities, relationship, and social 
circumstances[,)" for example, in a race-infected hate crime offense.123 
For utility, the templates must correspond to the facts and issues in 
controversy. Simon posits certain general standards of relevance to 
guide the process of framing.124 
Of these standards, the first is interpretive plausibility. Plausibility 
in the interpretation of law and fact in race cases is battered by lasting 
antebellum legal privilege and evidentiary presumption. White 
privilege, with its deep-seated bias, may mislead law. At the same 
time, presumptive white credibility may undermine fact. 
The second standard of relevance is practical impact. The salutary 
impact of reopening race cases on criminal and civil rights law, 
community, and inequality is unsure. If the cases flourish, legislatures 
may curtail the scope of applicable law. Judges may also ration its use. 
Even communities may resent its imposition. Meanwhile, inequality 
may prosper with its political and economic undercarriage intact. 
The third standard of relevance is knowledge. Prosecutor knowl­
edge of the issues in race cases is ostensibly confined to the sphere of 
121. Id. at 1 100. 
122. Id. at 1107. 
123. lei. at 1 107-08. 
124. Id. 
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criminal j ustice. Although triggered by crime, race cases develop out 
of conditions of political powerlessness and socioeconomic inequality. 
At bottom, the cases deal with discrimination shrouded in violence. 
Outside of the criminal-justice system, prosecutors' knowledge of 
discrimination and its repercussions for communities of color is often 
meager.125 
The fourth standard of relevance is institutional competence. 
Prosecutors in race cases possess the competence to investigate and 
indict white lawbreakers. Bolstered by courts, they join in the conduct 
of trials and negotiation of sentences. But their powers of penalty 
assignment and remedial monitoring are secondary to law enforce­
ment officials and managerial judges. Ill-equipped for relief-giving 
duties, prosecutors flounder outside their ken. 
Reframing state criminal-justice goals and claims in accordance 
with general standards of relevance is likely to narrow prosecutorial 
judgments of purpose and form in race cases. For prosecutors, inter­
pretive plausibility may prove too attenuated and practical impact too 
paltry. Absent sufficient knowledge and institutional competence to 
mobilize a broader political-legal reform strategy, they may submit 
their j udgments to the prosecution of discrete, disaggregated cases. In 
this surprising way, Simon's proffered bundle of standards help frame 
the relevant purpose and form of prosecutions in race cases. 
The intrinsic sources of legality and j ustice entwined in the 
calibrations of relative and internal merit lay down the normative 
foundation for prosecutorial discretion. That foundation is buttressed 
by the values of autonomy and good faith in decisionmaking. Race 
cases confront prosecutors with conflicting state and community 
commitments to legality and justice. The collision of prosecutor, state, 
and community norms calls for autonomy. 
Prosecutorial autonomy takes two forms: conciliation and inde­
pendence. Conciliation drives the prosecutor to find grounds for 
community agreement over racially revisionist state criminal-justice 
goals and claims. The agreement may come from republican dialogue 
and deliberation or from a shared vision of the common good. As the 
instant cases show, racial animus may prevent such agreement. It may 
hamper dialogue and disrupt deliberation. And it may preclude 
consensus over the selection and implementation of state ends. 
Independence prods the prosecutor to overcome racial discontinu­
ity in state commitments to legality and justice by returning to the 
legal values of internal merit. These values underscore the importance 
of independent community-oriented goal and claim selection. To an 
125. The community prosecution movement signals the gradual rectification of the ex­
tra-judicial neglect of race. See Jana Sorensen, Slums: A Dirty Shame, PROSECUTOR, 
Mar./Apr. 2001, at 34; Rita Spillane, Community Prosecutors as Pioneers, PROSECUTOR, 
Nov./Dec. 2002, at 34. 
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extent, that professional conviction is weakened by the prosecutor's 
own counterposing pledge to effect state-certified values and out­
comes, however bigoted and inequitable. Ascertaining community 
goals in race cases without the coincidence of prosecutor-state norma­
tive commitments requires reasoned and inclusive deliberation with 
both black and white communities. 
Community deliberation over the place of color in the prosecution 
of race cases makes no promise of consensus. In fact, to engage in such 
extra-state deliberation, prosecutors must adopt a denaturalized view 
of consensus that concedes the normal suppression of minority voices. 
Problematizing the notion of consensus in this way uncloaks prosecu­
tor tendencies towards coercion and exclusion. Exposing coercion and 
acknowledging exclusion in the traditional model of discretionary 
decisionmaking makes little progress toward prosecutor-community 
goal consensus or coincidence. But finding coherence and compatibil­
ity may be futile. Condemned to futility, prosecutors must neverthe­
less seek at least some sense of community confirmation or assent. 
The risk in seeking out such express or implied consent lies in prosecu­
torial overreaching.126 Deprived of intrinsic sources to curb over­
reaching and its unfettered discretion, prosecutors must rely on 
extrinsic sources of authority to guide their discretion.127 
B .  Standard Discretion: Extrinsic Sources 
Extrinsic sources of discretion restrain and embolden the reprose­
cution of race cases. These sources derive from ethics rules, constitu­
tional values, and community norms. Collectively, they shape the 
prosecution function alternately into an instrument of racial emanci­
pation and subordination. That instrumental function is exemplified 
by the charging decision. The contested site of conscious and uncon­
scious racism, charging constitutes an act of naming. The naming of a 
white offender and a black victim in race cases signifies prosecutorial 
freedom from the antebellum state and Jim Crow culture and society. 
The main source of extrinsic discretion comes from governing 
ethics rules arid standards. Promulgated by federal and state bar asso­
ciations, 128 national advisory groups,129 and governmental agencies,130 
126. See Angela J .  Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the 
Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393 (2001). 
127. For a more sympathetic account of intrinsic sources, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Im· 
poverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J.  2567, 2620-36 (1993) [hereinafter Alfieri, Impoverished 
Practices). 
128. See AMER. BAR ASS'N MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1983); AMER. 
BAR ASS'N MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2001); AMER. BAR ASS'N STANDARDS 
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1993). 
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and ratified by court enforcement, the rules and standards regulate 
prosecutorial power in charging, investigation, plea bargaining, trial 
practice, and sentencing.131 Regulation retreats from larger issues of 
adversary justice and institutional incentive.132 It prefers instead to 
address matters of conflict, impropriety, and discipline. 133 Discussion 
of these interstitial matters normally omits mention of racial identity 
and a racialized narrative. Even in the context of race cases, discussion 
routinely holds tightly to the position of neutrality. Tied to an adver­
sarial ethic, that position espouses the norms of partisanship and 
moral nonaccountability. 
Although stripped of moral accountability and express racial 
purpose, bar rules early established the prosecutorial duty to see that 
justice is done. Initially proclaimed under the American Bar 
Association's Canons of Professional Ethics, that public duty 
condemns fact suppression and witness tampering.134 The ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct reiterate the prosecutorial responsibil­
ity to serve as a minister of justice.135 Likewise, the ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice reaffirm the prosecutorial obligation to seek justice 
rather than merely convict.136 The Standards assign the prosecutor the 
129. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 97, 99, 
109, 112, 123 (2000); NAT'L DISTRICT ATTORNEYS Ass'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION 
STANDARDS (2d ed. 1991). 
130. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 9-27.000 to .745 
(1997) (enumerating principles of federal prosecution). 
131. See Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: 
The Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291 
(1992); Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the 
Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923 (1996); Donald G. Gif­
ford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 
U. ILL. L. REV. 37; Judy Platania & Gary Moran, Due Process and the Death Penalty: The 
Role of Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument in Capital Trials, 23 LA w & HUM. 
BEHAV. 471 (1999). 
132 See H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED PROSECUTION OF 
CRIME IN AMERICA (1996); Kenneth Bresler, "/ Never Lost a Trial": When Prosecutors Keep 
Score of Criminal Convictions, 9 GEO. J .  LEGAL ETHICS 537 (1996); Catherine Ferguson­
Gilbert, It ls Not Whether You Win or Lose, It is How You Play the Game: ls the Win-Loss 
Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283 (2001); 
Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and 
Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995). 
133. See Susan W. Brenner & James Geoffrey Durham, Towards Resolving Prosecutor 
Conflicts of Interest, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 415, 468-83 (1993); Roberta K. Flowers, What 
You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 
63 MO. L. REV. 699 {1998); Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many 
Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69 (1995); Fred C. 
Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors or, Who Should Regu­
late the Regulators?: Response to Little, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 429 (1996). 
134. See AMER. BAR ASS'N CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 5 (1908). 
135. See AMER. BAR ASS'N MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt (2003). 
136. See AMER. BAR ASS'N STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-l .2(c) 
(1993). 
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critical, quasi-judicial role of justice administrator. Entrusting him to 
pursue the interests of justice with broad discretionary powers, the 
Standards urge the prosecutor to elevate the quality of criminal jus­
tice.137 
The elevation of criminal justice to a higher standard of public 
ministration comports with the specific mandates of prevailing ethics 
rules.138 These rules issue four chief mandates: evidentiary burdens, 
the rights of the accused, the defender lawyer-client relationship, and 
trial-associated publicity. To discharge his evidentiary burdens, the 
prosecutor must marshal probable cause in support of the charging 
decision and make timely disclosure of evidence relevant to guilt and 
sentencing. To safeguard the accused, he must honor the right to 
obtain counsel and strive to prevent the unknowing waiver of pretrial 
rights. To preserve the defender lawyer-client relationship and the 
integrity of the adversary system, he must reign in the intrusions of 
lawyer-targeted subpoena power. To avert the prejudicial impact of 
pretrial and trial publicity, he must limit the extra-judicial statements 
of subordinates and refrain from illegitimate extra-judicial comments 
likely to arouse public condemnation of the accused.139 
Conferring the role of justice minister, these rule-issued mandates 
recognize the influence wielded by prosecutors in race cases. Bestowed 
as an institutional prerogative, that influence extends to charging, 
discovery, pretrial motions, trial practice, and sentencing. Each compo­
nent of practice corresponds to a differential form of discretion. And 
each risks the repetition of an essentializing construction of race in the 
cloak of victim and community inferiority. Cloaking victims and com­
munities of color in antebellum stigma is an act of normative privileging. 
That act forsakes the victim. Equally important, it severs the redemptive 
obligations of the offender. 
Shielding the victim from denigrating stigma and sparing the 
offender from undeserved retaliation in race cases prod prosecutors to 
draw upon a second extrinsic source of authority, bound up in the 
constitutional values of due process and equal protection.140 Exalted in 
137. See id. at Standard 3-l.2(d) cmt. 
138. See Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Coe/es: Theory, 
Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223 ( 1993). 
139. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a)-(f) cmt; see also AMER. BAR 
ASS'N MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(A)-(B) (1982); Scott M. Mathe­
son, Jr., The Prosecutor, the Press, and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 865 (1990). 
140. See Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections on the Id, the 
Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279 (2001); Michael T. 
Fisher, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and Due Process: There's More to Due 
Process than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1298 (1988); Donald G. Gifford, Equal 
Protection and the Prosecutor's Charging Decision: Enforcing an Ideal, 49 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 659 (198 1 ); Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth­
Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923 (2000). 
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the moral structure of the Constitution, these procedural and egali­
tarian norms unleash, and provide a bulwark against, prosecutorial 
incursions under the banner of state-law enforcement. The thrust of 
state criminal enforcement actions, however, oftentimes overwhelms 
procedural fortifications. Indeed, when carelessly planned, the incur­
sions quickly threaten to trample the dignitary interests of the victim 
and the equality interests of the offender. Dignitary interests concern 
self-worth and social value. Equality interests pertain to evenhanded 
treatment. For black victims, dignity is endangered by wounding 
treatment of the black body caused by prosecutor, jury, and public 
denigration.141 For white offenders, equality is imperiled by double 
jeopardy142 and speedy trial infractions.143 
Constitutional norms of dignity and equality are realized during the 
investigation and trial of race cases. The investigation of racially moti­
vated violence summons the managerial role of the prosecutor in 
supervising local law enforcement. That institutional role requires the 
fair-minded supervision of law enforcement officials in targeting, appre­
hending, and interrogating suspects. 
The trial of racial violence calls upon the educational role of the 
prosecutor in teaching the offender, jury, and community about the 
experience of violence and its manifold harm. Teaching harm to a 
segregated community inhabited by the offender and victim demands the 
abnegation of natural and scientific claims of racial inferiority.144 It also 
compels the disavowal of the virtues of separatism. 
141. See }ODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE 
HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 81-114 (1997); Kevin Brown, The Social 
Construction of a Rape Victim: Stories of African-American Males About the Rape of Desiree 
Washington, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 9'17; Ariela Gross, Pandora's Box: Slave Character on 
Trial in the Antebellum Deep South, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 267 (1995); Lawrence Vogel­
man, The Big Black Man Syndrome: The Rodney King Trial and the Use of Racial Stereo­
types in the Courtroom, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571 (1993). 
142. For useful discussions of double jeopardy in successive state-federal prosecutions, 
see Susan N. Herman, Double Jeopardy All Over Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney King, 
and the A CL U, 41 UCLA L. REV. 609 (1994), and Paul Hoffman, Double Jeopardy Wars: 
The Case for a Civil Rights "Exception," 41 UCLA L. REV. 649 (1994). See also Kenneth 
Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an 
Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887 (1998). 
143. Speedy trial safeguards emanate from both constitutional and statutory sources, 
including the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Sixth 
Amendment, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 
U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V, VI, & XIV; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (2000); FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b) 
& 50(b). On speedy trial principles, see Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword, Sixth Amendment 
First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 649-77 (1996), and George C. Thomas, III, When Constifll­
tional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers' Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 145, 228-31 {2001). See also Peter Applebome, Mississippi Hearing in Evers 
Slaying Pits Trial Rights against Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1992, at A 1 8. 
144. See Frank Dikotter, Race Culture: Recent Perspectives on the History of Eugenics, 
103 AM. HIST. REV. 467 {1998). 
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Teachings of moral import point to a third extrinsic source of discre­
tion in the guise of community. In race cases, the cardinal values of the 
criminal-justice system - retribution and redemption - stem from 
community norms. Stirred by vengeance, retribution entails punishment. 
Inspired by mercy, redemption entails penitence and forgiveness. Both 
victim-centered vengeance and offender-centered redemption reflect the 
character and custom of a community. Race-tom communities are likely 
to be the custodians of antebellum character and segregated custom. 
Their custodial stake in violence is inimical to the prosecutorial 
commitment to interracial justice. That stake may be unyielding. It may 
rebuff appeals to criminal justice, public welfare, and constitutional 
value. It may refuse to treat violence as a collective injury. And it may 
reject the role of prosecutor as the trustee of the common good.145 
Founded on social contract theory, the prosecutor-trustee role 
requires institutional deference by offender and victim alike. It also 
necessitates interracial reciprocity by offender and victim support groups 
and their communities. Deference highlights the intrinsic sources of 
prosecutorial discretion. It leaves the judgments of legality and justice to 
the prosecutor. Reciprocity underscores the extrinsic sources of prosecu­
torial discretion. It hinges on the outside judgments of ethical 
concurrence, constitutional valuation, and community conviction.146 
Together, deference and reciprocity transform the prosecutorial 
role. That transformation invigorates the redemptive aspect of the 
prosecutorial function. Employed as state agents of redemption, 
prosecutors stand free to enunciate the norms of penitence, forgive­
ness, and mercy. However alluring, their newfound theology of heal­
ing founders in race cases. Although deduced from intrinsic and ex­
trinsic sources of prosecutorial discretion, it fails to install a racial 
compass to guide discretion in the use of colorblind, color-coded, and 
color-conscious modes of analysis. The next Part elucidates the 
distinctions of color consciousness in prosecutorial discretion. 
IV. RACE-CONSCIOUS DISCRETION 
The notion of race-conscious discretion offers an alternative justi­
fication for the resurgent prosecution of white-on-black racial 
violence. Extracted from the normative foundation established by 
standard discretion, the notion of race-conscious prosecutorial discre­
tion holds a shared commitment to legality and justice. It bolsters that 
commitment by like reference to ethics, constitutional values, and 
community norms. Despite these common intrinsic and extrinsic 
145. See Elisa E. Ugarte, The Government Lawyer and the Common Good, 40 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 269, 274-78 (1999). 
146. For an earlier account of prosecutor roles, see Alfieri, Prosecuting Vio­
lence/Reconstructing Community, supra note 1,  at 831-49. 
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origins, standard and race-conscious forms of discretion differ. The 
crux of the difference lies in adversarial faith. 
Standard discretion posits a misplaced faith in the adversary sys­
tem. Modernist rather than absolutist in tone, that faith concedes inci­
dental and systemic error. Incidental errors are performative. They 
point to deficiencies in the performance of law enforcement, advocacy, 
and adjudication functions. The deficiencies are treated as isolated 
and ephemeral. Even when obdurate, they are deemed susceptible to 
individual correction. In contrast, systemic errors disclose deficiencies 
in the basic structure of law enforcement, advocacy, and adjudication. 
The deficiencies are recurrent and intractable. Impervious to change, 
they withstand individual and institutional remedy. 
The acknowledgement of incidental and systemic error within the 
adversary system of criminal justice overlooks the virulence of race. 
This oversight is endemic to the standard conception. To overlook 
race is not to deny it. Prosecutors guided by standard discretion admit 
to race in the profiling of offenders, in the selection of jurors and jury 
pools, and in shopping for judges. They also admit to race in the narra­
tive texts of their opening statements, closing arguments, and pretrial 
comments. Yet, these admissions are blind to color in its full norma­
tive and social meaning. 
The institutional faith of standard discretion emanates from 
suppression. Standard discretion suppresses the normative conse­
quence of coloring identity and narrative, and the social significance of 
coloring advocacy. Part of the explanation for this suppression 
pertains to the individualistic content of the criminal law and the 
adversary system. The criminal law principally contemplates solitary 
wrongdoing. The adversary system primarily addresses individual law­
breakers. Neither focuses on community transgression and collective 
responsibility for lawbreaking.147 
Additionally, part of the explanation for the suppression of color 
relates to the neutral pretense of the ethical canons of the legal profes­
sion. The pretense of neutrality is inextricably linked to partisanship 
and moral nonaccountability. Partisanship veils colored discourse in 
the ethos of adversarialism. Moral nonaccountability excuses it inside 
and outside the domain of law. Repeated evidence of this pretense is 
discoverable in the norms and meanings of racial discourse in the 
criminal-justice system. Routinely heard among prosecutors, and 
echoed among lawyer defenders, judges, and law enforcement agents, 
that discourse approves distinct modes of colorblind, color-coded, and 
color-conscious representation. However biased in content and 
147. On collective guilt and responsibility for community transgression, see Sanford 
Cloud Jr., The Next Bold Step Toward Racial Healing and Reconciliation: Dealing with the 
Legacy of Slavery, 45 How. L.J. 157 (2001), and George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: 
Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 1 1 1  YALE L.J. 1499 (2002). 
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discriminatory in effect, none· of these narrative modes apparently 
departs from neutrality. Evidently, they are merely partisan. At worst, 
they are overzealous. More important, none of the modes is presumed 
to be adverse to identity or inimical to community. 
Rhetorical approval or disapproval of the trope of color signals 
competing public commitments to racial identity and status in law and 
society. Historical crimes of white-on-black racial violence give prose­
cutors the opportunity to realize their commitments to color in the 
ongoing decisions of criminal advocacy. The vectors of punishment 
and mercy form a basic dyad of commitment for the prosecutor in his 
public role of crime-fighting sentinel and criminal-justice minister. 
Fulfilling that dual role in a redemptive spirit of conciliation may 
prove beneficial to the struggle for interracial community justice. But 
it may invite the popular condemnation of victim and offender groups. 
No offender or victim - white or black - stands alone apart from 
his identity-based community. Materially, each comes from situated 
family and community circumstances. Symbolically, each reflects the 
character of that original community, either in a discrete feature or in 
a multiplicity of traits. At all times, each offender and victim belongs 
to a specific group or a collection of community groups. Ordinarily 
consigned to colorblind or color-coded adversarial conflict, those 
groups may collide differently in a move to race-conscious, redemptive 
prosecution. 
Faced with white-on-black violence, black-victim groups may look 
to race-conscious, redemptive prosecutions on egalitarian grounds, 
demanding equal punishment for white lawbreakers. White offender 
groups may view the same prosecutions on procedural grounds, 
insisting on the protection of due process safeguards for lawbreakers. 
The clash of state-sponsored restorative conciliation, victim-implored 
instrumental vengeance, and unrepentant offender-pleaded proce­
dural formalism is the paradox of racially redemptive prosecution in 
the adversary context of retributive punishment. That clash indicates 
that race-conscious, redemptive bids for interracial reconciliation may 
be incompatible with the reprisal norms of adversarial j ustice. It also 
suggests that such bids may be incongruent with community senti­
ment, insofar as community may be said to exist in a racially polarized 
state. 
The liberal imagination, beset by a plural tolerance for divided 
community, offers little chance of resolving this central paradox of 
race-conscious, redemptive prosecution. Closely tied to the rational 
individualism of adversarial contest, liberalism holds limited tools 
from which to build a legal process of racial conciliation. Individualism 
strains to engage in the dialogue and other-directed empathy required 
for reconciliation. Tolerance prefers the passivity of secular forbear­
ance to the affirmative, identity-imbued clasp of reconciliation. 
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Pluralism endorses a weak sense of community best defined by com­
petition rather than cooperative consensus. 
The atomized fellowship, meek tolerance, and thin consensus of 
liberal community are further undermined by critical race j urispru­
dence. Critical race theorists castigate liberal tolerance for its 
repression of diversity. They also rebuke liberal consensus for manu­
facturing a false civic accord. Solicitous of intersectional color and its 
promise of common fellowship, they call for a more inclusive tolerance 
and a more genuine consensus across racial lines traditionally dividing 
African-American, Latino/a, Asian, and Native-American communi­
ties. 
Race-conscious, redemptive discretion joins liberal and critical 
race j urisprudence in reconstructing the adversarial model of prosecu­
tion. Both liberal and critical race scholars point to pervasive evidence 
of race discrimination in law and society.148 In the criminal-justice 
setting, scholars observe patterns of disparity binding race, crime, and 
criminal justice.149 The patterns surface in prosecutorial charging150 and 
court sentencing.151 Their repercussions materialize in accusations of 
selective prosecution152 and in damage to black communities.153 
148. See IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF 
RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001);' CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL 
JUSTICE - A QUESTION OF COLOR (1993); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Burdens and Bene­
fits of Race in America, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219 (1998). 
149. See BENJAMIN BOWLING & CORETTA PHILLIPS, RACISM, CRIME AND JUSTICE 
(2002); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997); SAMUEL WALKER ET 
AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CRIME IN AMERICA (2d ed. 2000); 
RACE, ETHNICITY, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, VIOLENT CRIME: THE REALITIES AND THE 
MYTHS (Nathaniel J. Pallone ed., 2000); Richard R. W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: 
Criminal Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1219 (2000); Angela J .  Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 
94 MICH. L. REV. 1660 (1 996); Anna Wang, Beyond Black and White: Crime and Foreign­
ness in the News, 8 ASIAN L.J. 187 (2001). 
150. See Amy Grossman Applegate, Prosecutorial Discretion and Discrimination in the 
Decision to Charge, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 35 (1982); Raymond Paternoster, Prosecutorial Discre­
tion in Requesting the Death Penalty: A Case of Victim-Based Racial Discrimination, 18 LAW 
& SOC'Y REV. 437 (1984); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial 
Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 587 (1985); Cassia Spohn et al., The 
Impact of the Ethnicity and Gender of Defendants on the Decision to Reject or Dismiss Fel­
ony Charges, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 175 (1987). 
151. See SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION (1989); 
Kathryn Roe Eldridge, Racial Disparities in the Capital System: Invidious or Accidental?, 14 
CAP. DEF. J. 305 (2002); Larry Michael Fehr, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Prosecution 
and Sentencing: Empirical Research of the Washington State Minority and Justice Commis­
sion, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 577 (1996-97); David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Dis­
parities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285 (2001); 
Charles Ogletree, The Significance of Race in Federal Sentencing, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 
229 (1994). 
152. See Paul Butler, Starr is to Clinton as Regular Prosecutors Are to Blacks, 40 B.C. L. 
REV. 705 (1999); P.S. Kane, Why Have You Singled Me Out? The Use of Prosecutorial Dis­
cretion for Selective Prosecution, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2293 (1993); Romero, supra note 109. 
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Scholarship documenting these repercussions and searching out 
remedies demonstrates that race consciousness, and the offshoots of 
affirmative action and multiculturalism, are not the sole preserve of 
critical race scholars.154 Stitched in race-neutral color, they are already 
embroidered in the liberal text of ethics rules governing the adversary 
system. 
To their credit, ethics rules prohibit bias in prosecutor charging, 
discovery, pretrial jury selection, trial practice, and more. Guided by 
adversarial norms, the rules emphasize procedural j ustice and eviden­
tiary fairness. The ABA Standards, for example, bar intentional 
misrepresentation, bad faith, knowing offers of false or inadmissible 
evidence, and misstatements of evidence. As previously mentioned, 
they also regulate extra-judicial public statements calculated to cause 
prejudice. More profoundly, they ban invidious racial discrimination 
in mounting an investigation or prosecution.155 
The ban on invidious discrimination enmeshes prosecutors in 
debate beyond the choice of allocating intrinsic and extrinsic sources 
of discretion. Without diminishing the importance of that debate to 
prosecutorial decisions at indictment or at voir dire, sorting out the 
right balance of discretionary sources is unlikely to resolve the 
parameters of a race-conscious duty in cases of white-on-black racial 
violence. Compelled by the facts of violence but pinioned between the 
ideals of colorblind constitutionalism and the practical efficacy of 
color-coded stereotypes, prosecutors may be tempted to opt for covert 
resolution . .  Put simply, they may resort to a clandestine style of race­
conscious decisionmaking behind a veneer of race-neutral rhetoric, a 
style evident only in its de facto consequences. 
Clothed in the adversarial tradition, this pretextual style of race­
neutral prosecution actually may serve the key interests of victims and 
communities of color in race cases. Refashioning antebellum and 
postbellum codes of color into retributive claims, it might deliver indi­
vidualized justice to black victims and kindle the collective healing of 
black communities. Concurrently, it might exact justice from white 
offenders and thereby invite the partial redemption of white commu-
153. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Dam­
age of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005 (2001). 
154. Compare Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial 
Distinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1864 (1990), and Ilhyung 
Lee, Race Consciousness and Minority Scholars, 33 CONN. L. REV. 535 {2001), with Samuel 
Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 669 (1998), and Nancy 
S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659 (2002), and Reginald 
Leamon Robinson, The Shifting Race-Consciousness Matrix and the Multiracial Category 
Movement, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231 (2000), and Daria Roithmayr, Direct Measures: 
An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2001). 
155. See AMER. BAR ASS'N STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-3.1, 3-5.8 
(1993). 
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nities. In such ways, it might mediate the prosecutorial tension of 
competing commitments to privately incurred punishment and 
publicly displayed justice. Finally, it might fulfill the obligation of 
liberal community to tolerate a continuing partition among still 
divided and often implacable racial groups. 
On any yardstick, these are substantial accomplishments. What­
ever the pretext, to meet even partially the interests of victim and 
offender communities and to carry out the purposes of private and 
public j ustice are formidable achievements. They gain added luster by 
satisfying the goals of liberalism and the imperatives of legality. 
Although not enhanced by the pretense of race-neutrality, surely the 
value of legality is not lessened by its presence. Similarly, the value of 
liberalism is not diluted by the inauthenticity of racial pretense, par­
ticularly when, as here, it fosters consequentialist goals. What may be 
diminished are the value of open procedure and the virtue of j uridical 
candor. Redemption depends in substantial measure on the values of 
process and candor. 
Race-conscious discretion borrows impoverished norms of process 
and candor from the standard conception of discretion. Importing 
these norms replicates the complications of private retribution and 
public redemption that irk the standard conception. Even with the 
embellishments of legality and justice, those complications may be 
insoluble. Race-conscious discretion merely extends the tenets of 
liberal legalism; it does not cure or displace them. Sympathetically 
extended, standard discretion may be pressed into closer alliance with 
the goals of interracial community and citizenship. That alliance 
requires the recognition of racial status and the elevation of process 
and candor in prosecuting race cases. 
Inscribed in sociolegal identity and narrative, racial status is 
obscured in the colorblind and color-coded prosecution of race cases. 
Colorblind prosecution avoids the inscription of status out of formalist 
conviction. Avoidance shuns status distinctions as irrelevant to the 
advocacy process. That process is relatively open and candid. But it 
may frustrate the goals of race case prosecutions. Color-coded prose­
cution, on the other hand, evades confession of the inscription of racial 
status for instrumental purposes. Evasion of this sort covertly 
preserves status distinctions as relevant to the advocacy process but 
denies, or publicly withholds, its endorsement of such distinctions and 
their tactical relevance for fear of inviting claims of prejudice. This 
process is oblique and dissembling. Nonetheless, it may better advance 
the goals of race prosecutions. 
Discarding the neutral claims of standard discretion under color­
blind and color-coded prosecutions unseals the advocacy process in 
race cases exposing its race-conscious purposes. Candid disclosure of 
those purposes is a virtue unacknowledged by standard discretion. 
Disclosure is a virtue because it brings honesty to the public debate 
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over racial injustice, and because it furthers the public policy of racial 
reparation for individual victims of violence and of redemption for 
communities inured to violence, white and black. 
The virtue of candor in embracing racial status and in designing a 
race-conscious process of advocacy links the prosecution function to 
citizenship. This linkage wrests the meaning of black citizenship from 
the stigma of antebellum and postbellum characterizations. Wresting 
meaning from the stigmatizing portraits of black victims and their 
accompanying communities revives a dialogic process in law, culture, 
and society. Revival stirs cross-racial economic exchange, social 
interaction, and political participation. These moments of community 
dialogue and joinder intimate the possibility of reconciliation. 
At the same time, the linkage rescues white citizenship from its 
collective acceptance of antebellum and postbellum racial indignity 
and inequality. Rescuing white citizenship from its own acquiescence 
in such inequities allows for a kind of collective redemption. White 
redemption is grounded in the sorrow of remorse. Unlike black 
redemption and its locus of retribution, white redemption seeks to 
repair and to reconcile relations of historical violence. That allowance 
arrives from the candid prosecutorial decision to present the advocacy 
process openly as a means to restore the dignity of black victims and 
to redeem the conscience of white offenders, their communities, and 
the state. 156 Restoration includes black retribution and forgiveness. 
Redemption includes white punishment and penitence. Retributive 
punishment and mercy are integral to the reciprocal morality of 
citizenship. Reciprocity honors the norms of dignity and mutual re­
spect. It forges sympathetic attachments across racial lines. 
The candid process orientation of race-conscious discretion 
burdens the already strained prosecutoriaJ role of state partisan and 
public minister. As a partisan of the state, the prosecutor strives to 
enforce the law by preventing, deterring, and punishing wrongdoing. 
As a minister of justice, he seeks to find the right result in balancing 
the interests of the accused, the victim, and the public. This role com­
petition occurs along a shifting boundary line. That line is affixed to 
color. It dictates the freedom and constraint to engage in colorblind, 
color-coded, and color-conscious advocacy. To be effective, the 
156. Symbolically and normatively, candor exposes criminal reprosecutions as a cate­
gory of race trials, rather than the more blunt category of political trials. See David Garland, 
Punishment and Culture: The Symbolic Dimension of Criminal Justice, in 11 STUDIES IN 
LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 191 (Austin Sarat & Susan s. Silbey eds., 1991); Joseph E. 
Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 
51 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (2000). Compare DANIEL W. SHUMAN & ALEXANDER MCCALL 
SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE PROSECUTION OF OLD CRIMES: BALANCING LEGAL, 
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MORAL CONCERNS (2000), with AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 159-
77 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1994). 
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boundaries of freedom and constraint must be reasonably determi­
nate. In race cases, the boundary lines are frustratingly indeterminate. 
Prosecutors experience the indeterminacy of color in assembling 
the goals and claims of race cases. Based on victim, offender, and 
community interests, those goals and claims may be asserted under 
colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious standards of discretion. 
The standards shape the character of identity and the content of narra­
tive heard in advocacy. Identity and narrative are highly contingent on 
fact and law. The complex accumulation of facts and the aggregation 
of multiple legal theories and authorities in race cases heightens this 
sense of indeterminacy. In the racial spiral of retrospectively collected 
factual claims and statutorily culled legal claims, the lines separating 
colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious advocacy blur. 
The indeterminacy of fact produced in unearthing long-buried evi­
dence157 and in amassing legal materials gives race cases an unbounded 
quality where zealous advocacy seems to proceed unrestricted. That 
unbounded sense is intensified by the brutality of the underlying crime 
and the intervening passage of time. Unlike antecedent crimes and 
periods of racial violence, the reprosecution of race cases gives rise to 
an epochal sense of historic combat and enduring legacy. Gripped by 
this sensibility, prosecutors struggle to balance their duties to law 
enforcement and public j ustice. Instead of finding equipoise, they 
collapse the duties into a single compelling partisan obligation to 
avenge violence by any colored means necessary. 
The coloring of partisanship into racially coded advocacy is 
restrained by the intrinsic and extrinsic sources of standard discretion. 
That restraint is partial. Given the compulsion of zealous advocacy, 
neither the factors of legality and justice, nor the variables of ethics 
rules, constitutional values, and community norms, supplies adequate 
controls. Insofar as each set of considerations draws on a lawyer's 
practical judgment in the interpretation of legal rules, the purpose of 
the rules may itself provide mitigating restraint. Both criminal and 
civil rights laws harbor compelling public purposes. 
The reprosecution of race cases entails the application of lawyer 
judgment in interpreting the purposes of criminal and civil rights laws. 
Applying legal rules signals lawyer independence. Discretion is a 
function of that independence. The race-conscious exercise of lawyer 
discretion seeks to integrate the interests of the victim, offender, and 
public into the normative framework of criminal and civil rights law. 
That framework contains punitive and redemptive purposes rooted in 
penitence, reparation, and even restoration. Integration strives to 
157. See Marlon Manuel, Church Bombing Case Tums on Old Evidence, ATLANTA J.­
CONST., May 1, 2001, at AS; Jean Marbella, Sins of Past Still Cry Out for Justice Conscience: 
Witnesses are Breaking Years of Silence and Calling Aging Men to Answer for Crimes of the 
1960s, BALT. SUN, May 20, 2001, at Cl. 
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unify the interests of the accused, the victim, and the public in 
punishing white defendants and in redeeming white communities. 
Absent black and white community reconciliation, redemption will be 
subverted and the overarching purposes of criminal and civil rights 
laws will be nullified.158 
The pursuit of black-white reconciliation motivates the race­
conscious model of purposive lawyering. This independent-minded 
practice model departs from an adversarial framework. Yet, like its 
predecessor, that purposive framework relies on ethics rules and 
standards for regulation. The colorblind instincts and color-coded ten­
dencies of conventional ethics rules undermine the candor demanded 
of race-conscious discretion. Accommodating candid midlevel proce­
dures in reprosecutions that account for racial status, ·multiple 
party interests, and competing private and public needs requires 
independent judgment reached in collaboration with black and white 
communities. Cross-cutting collaboration is the springboard for com­
munity-guided ethical discretion in race cases. The next Part considers 
the basis for community-guided restorative discretion. 
V. COMMUNITY-GUIDED RESTORATIVE DISCRETION 
The idea of community-guided restorative discretion furnishes an 
additional justification for the resurgent prosecution of white-on-black 
racial violence. Restorative discretion modifies standard prosecutorial 
discretion by loosening adversarial norms and intermixing race­
conscious community norms. Modification leaves intact the intrinsic 
sources of legality and justice as well as the extrinsic sources of ethics, 
constitutional values, and community norms. 
Restoratively gleaned, intrinsic and extrinsic sources of discretion 
channel prosecutors toward interracial reconciliation. Under the stan­
dard conception of discretion, the intrinsic value of legality creates 
powerful law enforcement imperatives. Rather than weaken those 
imperatives, race-conscious discretion expands the framework of 
legality to encompass the public purposes of relevant criminal and civil 
rights laws. 
Restorative discretion further enlarges that framework to take 
account of both victim and community reparations.159 In race cases, 
158. For useful discussions of indeterminacy and independence in lawyering, see Robert 
W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988), and David B. Wilkins, 
Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992). See also Alfieri, Impover­
ished Practices, supra note 127, at 2654-60. 
159. See ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION (2001); Anthony E. 
Cook, King and the Beloved Community: A Communitarian Defense of Black Reparations, 
68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 959 (2000); Alfred L. Brophy, Losing the {Understanding the Im­
portance of} Race: Evaluating the Significance of Race and the Utility of Reparations, 80 
TEXAS L. REV. 911 (2002) (reviewing JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF 
SABOTAGE IN BLACK AMERICA (2000)). 
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reparations refer to both spiritual and material recompense. The 
reparations may come from the offender in the form of atonement and 
restitution, from white communities in the form of public penitence, or 
from the state in the form of contrition and compensation for mental, 
physical, and economic harm.160 Of greater symbolic than monetary 
value, the offering of apology may contribute to racial conciliation.161 
Similarly instilled within standard discretion, the intrinsic value of 
justice commands potent retributive claims. Incited by vengeance, the 
claims implicitly boast the vigor of prevention and deterrence. Taken 
seriously, this boast suggests that the severity of vengeance works not 
only to prevent (by death), but also to deter (by fear) crimes of racial 
violence. Race-conscious discretion applauds such instrumental 
averments. Explicit in remedial purpose, it seeks to halt racial vio­
lence. 
Restorative discretion views the plaudits of vengeance with more 
reservation. In spite of its asserted efficacy, vengeance wreaks 
profound damage on community. For some communities of color, the 
damage may prove irreparable. The joint failure of white communities 
and the state to enjoin or remedy that damage weighs heavily on 
conciliation, diminishing the likelihood of black forgiveness. The dete­
rioration of forgiveness renders mercy for white offenders and their 
communities improbable. The decline of mercy in turn may discourage 
acts of atonement. Absent atonement, redemption ceases. 
The debilitation of intrinsic sources of discretion under the stan­
dard conception of prosecution also saps extrinsic sources. Ethics 
rules, for instance, blinded by the pretense of neutrality, stumble in 
regulating the color-coded practices that permeate the criminal-justice 
system. Race-conscious discretion cures this blindness only to 
substitute a different sort of myopia. That is the myopia induced by 
the unstable boundaries of color in advocacy. 
Even for clear-eyed prosecutors, the lines segmenting colorblind, 
color-coded, and color-conscious claims of advocacy fluctuate and 
regularly fade from view. Restorative discretion accepts this fluctua­
tion as part of the instability of race and the mutability of racial 
identity. It appreciates that the facts of racial violence and the laws 
delineating its prosecution are vulnerable to multifaceted readings 
that may veer interpretatively from colorblind to color-coded and 
back. It also recognizes that these distinctions are contextual, surfacing 
in the everyday practice of advocacy and adjudication. 
160. See Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway, Restitution Program Models with Adult Offend­
ers, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESTITUTION, AND RECONCILIATION 165 (Burt Galaway & Joe 
Hudson eds., 1990). 
161. On the use and subversion of apology, see Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The 
Cornrnodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000), and Deborah L. Levi, Note, The 
Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1997). 
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Densely layered within criminal-justice roles, relations, and institu­
tions, distinctions of color frequently resist easy discernment. Prosecu­
torial roles in courtroom advocacy and neighborhood outreach nimbly 
combine colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious approaches, for 
example in jury selection and "qualify-of-life" policing.162 Prosecuto­
rial relations with offenders, criminal defense lawyers, and judges 
mingle the same approaches in street-level profiling and disqualifica­
tion motions.163 Prosecutorial institution-wide policies also blend these 
approaches in charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing.164 Sometimes 
interchangeable, the approaches succumb to conscious and uncon­
scious bias. 
The insinuations of bias are entrenched in the materials of law and 
the tactics of advocacy. Colorblind claims may appear facially neutral 
and laudable, yet they may shelter animus. Without refuge from 
invidious intent, such claims engender racially disparate consequences 
in law enforcement. Color-coded claims may seem correspondingly 
neutral, yet they too elicit suspiciously disparate effects.165 Even when 
prosecutors dispense with the veneer of impartiality in favor of a 
color-conscious approach, their claims may produce disparate 
outcomes, especially where race intersects gender, ethnicity, or 
sexuality. Despite these intricacies and contradictions, restorative dis­
cretion trusts the practical discernment of colored boundaries to the 
good faith of prosecutorial judgment, checked by community-guided 
intrinsic and extrinsic sources of restraint.166 
Extrinsic sources of community-guided discretion flow from the 
constitutional values of dignity and equality. Aimed at offender-
162. Compare GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN 
WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996), with 
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN 
WINDOWS POLICING (2001), and Dorothy E. Roberts, Race, Vagueness, and the Social 
Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999). 
163. See Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, 
and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457 (2000); F. Michael Higgin­
botham, In Memoriam: A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. - A Man for All Seasons, 16 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER L.J. 7, 1 1  (2000); Martha Minow, Strippe<I Down Like a Runner or Enriched 
by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201 
(1992). For discussion of race-based recusal and disqualification motions, see Blank v. Sulli­
van & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), and Pennsylvania v. Local 542, lnt'l Union 
of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 
164. On prosecutorial coloring in charging, plea bargaining, trial, and sentencing, see 
LOU FALKNER WILLIAMS, THE GREAT SOUTH CAROLINA KU KLUX KLAN TRIALS, 1871-
1872 (1996); Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: En­
forcing Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071 (1997), and 
Lu-in Wang, Unwarranted Assumption in the Prosecution and Defense of Hate Crimes, 17 
CRIM. JUST. 4 (2002). 
165. On the appearance of prejudice, see Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The 
Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
166. See Alfieri, Community Prosecutors, supra note 10, at 1480-91 ,  1502-07. 
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specific retribution and unmindful of victim well-being, standard 
discretion discounts the value of dignitary and equality interests. 
Constitutional norms elevate dignity in safekeeping individual 
integrity and collective liberty from state onslaught or neglect. 
Moreover, they enhance equality in securing the evenhanded protec­
tion of communities. In race cases, those interests unite black victims 
and their communities. 
Dignity applies equally in life and death. It is the root indignity of 
white superiority and black inferiority that instigates white-on-black 
violence. The act of white violence compounds that indignity. The 
failure to prosecute white violence, and to eradicate its societal under­
pinnings, magnifies indignity and ensures its continuation. 
Equality also pertains to life and death. It is the inequality of the 
white-black hierarchy in economic and social relationships that 
permits a culture of white-on-black violence to flourish. Repeated acts 
of white violence reinforce black subordinate positions in that 
hierarchy. The historic failure to punish white violence, and alter the 
asymmetrical relationships of socioeconomic status, preserves 
inequality in society and guarantees a powerless black position in 
politics. 
Race-conscious discretion honors victim dignitary and equality 
values. Highlighting the plight of black victims and the menace to 
black communities, it attacks white violence for lawbreaking and for 
denigrating individual and collective dignity. It focuses that attack on 
racial status, adducing evidence of status-based motive in offender 
conduct and summoning statutory sanction under criminal and civil 
rights law. Strengthened by a penalty-enhancement proviso, that 
summons increasingly calls on hate crime legislation for remedy. 
Although hate crime legislation captures the thrust of racial violence, 
it mislays emphasis on retaliation. Reprisal cedes slim ground for 
redemption. 
Restorative discretion mitigates the retaliatory force of race­
conscious hate crime prosecution. Endeavoring to repair dignity and 
equality through conciliation, it petitions for offender atonement, 
victim forgiveness, and state mercy. Contraposed to the punitive 
appeal of standard and race-conscious discretion, the petition declares 
the redeemability of white lawbreakers and the possibility of racial re­
form even when personal history and practical reason tilt to the con­
trary. That declaration complicates the relationship of punishment to 
redemption. 
Nothing in the formal definition of redemption precludes punish­
ment. In fact, its predicate acts - atonement, contrition, penitence -
imply punishment of a robust size. The acts signal an acknowledge­
ment of wrongdoing. This admission, coupled with promises of 
physical rehabilitation and spiritual reformation, hardly amounts to 
punishment. For redemption to be credible, some deprivation of 
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proportionate duration and severity must ensue. Pressed too far in 
severity, punishment may undermine the chance of white contrition.167 
In the same way, violence pushed too far in its brutality may undercut 
the prospect of black forgiveness. Cruelty in either respect runs afoul 
of redemption. 
To survive incidents of private violence and public punishment, 
restorative discretion must establish a benchmark for the reinstallation 
of dignity and equality. The preference for reinstallation over restora­
tion stems from the difficulty of recollecting black dignity and equality 
in American law and society. Recollections gathered from antebellum, 
postbellum, and Jim Crow eras find dignity battered and equality 
destitute. Neither finding is fatal to redemption. 
Dignity inhabits manifold public and private spheres. The spheres 
are cross-cut by cleavages of race. The cleavages divide public space 
into black and white redoubts. Within these strongholds, black 
communities realize their own sense of dignity inlayed by culture and 
social history.168 Outside of these strongholds, where public space 
overlaps black and white geography in culture, economics, and 
politics, black communities suffer the indignities of inferiority, 
subordination, and violence.169 Inexorably, the battering of black dig­
nity in a white-dominated public space will disturb the experience of 
black dignity in alternative public and private spaces. 
To disturb dignity is not to extinguish it. The civil rights movement 
demonstrates that dignity can endure public violence and private 
humiliation. 170 The early history of the movement in particular shows 
that dignity can overcome even unbridled violence.'7' Triumphing over 
violence unsuccessfully resolves the tension spawned by differential 
assessments of dignitary values by victims and communities of color, 
167. Punishment may influence demonstrations of remorse. See Theodore Eisenberg et 
al. , But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. Rev. 
1599 (1998); Austin Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment: An Analysis 
of Popular Culture, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 168-90 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); Michael 
A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 V AND. L. 
Rev. 1 (2003); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial 
Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. Rev. 1557 (1998). 
168. See Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1803 (2000). 
169. See Regina Austin, "An Honest Living": Street Vendors, Municipal Regulation, and 
the Black Public Sphere, 103 YALE L.J. 21 19  (1994); Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves": 
Securing Black People's Right to Shop and to Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. Rev. 147; 
Regina Austin, "Not Just for the Fun of It!": Governmental Restraints on Black Leisure, So­
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the public, and the state. That tension is inescapable given the rich 
diversity of color, the separatist fervor of the public, and the segrega­
tionist legacy of the state.172 The failure to organize some union among 
these variable assessments limits the redemptive guidance of constitu­
tional values. 
Comparable limits impinge on the constitutional value of equality 
in restorative discretion. Like the attempt to recapture black dignity, 
the effort to restore black equality collides with the recollections of 
hardship mined from the antebellum, postbellum, and Jim Crow eras. 
Those recollections provide a benchmark for equality notched by 
poverty and stratification. That benchmark is anathema to restorative 
discretion. The handiwork of post-Reconstruction tools for demeaning 
socioeconomic status, the benchmark recalls a time of malignant 
inequality that continues in many sectors of the black community.173 
To obtain a more satisfactory principle of equality in guiding race 
cases, prosecutors must turn again to the civil rights movement, par­
ticularly to antidiscrimination laws.174 Unlike the more controversial 
claim of preferential treatment,175 the turn to civil rights and its 
memory of struggle176 points to the inadequacy of the colorblind 
approach in alleviating inequality in the criminal-justice system.177 For 
race cases, only a forward-looking race-conscious approach to prose­
cution intent upon ameliorating the socioeconomic position of black 
communities will satisfy the goal of restorative justice. Amelioration 
comes in uplifting the legal, socioeconomic, and political status of 
communities, not simply in a flurry of apologies or an award of repara­
tions. 
172 See Anita Christina Butera, Assimilation, Pluralism and Multiculturalism: The Pol­
icy of RaciaVEthnic Identity in America, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2001); Patrick F. 
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REV. 943 (2002). 
176. See Katherine M. Franke, The Uses of History in Struggles for Racial Justice: Colo­
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Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and 
Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267 (2001). 
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Uplifting the racial status •of victims and communities of color 
slows the dilution of extrinsic sources of discretion under the standard 
colorblind approach to race case prosecutions. Community norms 
maintain a weak presence in the exercise of standard discretion. 
Displaced by adversarial rituals, the norms are shunted aside in the 
individualized hunt for criminal convictions.178 Both offender and 
victim communities are shunned in this hunt, their participation 
stunted, and their voices silenced.179 
Race-conscious discretion reincorporates community into the 
prosecution process. Implanting the offender and victim in commu­
nity, it searches white and black constituents for signs of color 
consciousness. It is color that connects the private acts of criminal 
lawbreaking to a public constellation of actors. For white offenders, 
color connects up to communities founded on racial superiority. For 
black victims, color attaches to communities trapped by racial inf eri­
ority. Release from these parallel entrapments requires the blunt, 
race-conscious assignment of collective responsibility to white com­
munities tolerant of racial violence and to states complicit in such ac­
quiescence, an acquiescence that signals the collapse of public/private 
boundaries recognized by postbellum constitutional and statutory 
jurisprudence enacted by Congress during Reconstruction.180 It also 
demands race-conscious sensitivity to the insidious devaluation of 
black communities as cultural and economic resources. 
1 78. On the integration of community norms in criminal and civil rights law, see PENDA 
D. HAIR, ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION, LOUDER THAN WORDS: LAWYERS, COMMUNITIES 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 151-55 (2001) (urging incorporation of race into a com­
munity framework of justice). See also John 0. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional 
Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1927 (1999); Steven F. Lawson, Freedom Then, Freedom Now: The Historiography 
of the Civil Rights Movement, 96 AM. HIST. REV. 456 (1991); Christian Sundquist, Critical 
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Law School, Stanford Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Research Paper 
No. 50, Feb. 2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
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Standing alone, neither race-conscious responsibility nor race­
conscious evaluation will achieve restorative results. To achieve 
restorative j ustice, white communities must accept responsibility for 
violence and contrition. Inversely, black communities must shoulder 
the obligation of forgiveness. Redemptive responsibility is not easily 
seized or imposed. It is a process shaken by internal quarrel over the 
criminal-justice goals and claims of prosecution in race cases. 
Internal quarrels over prosecution goals and claims upset commu­
nities and state agents. Broadening prosecutorial goals from punish­
ment to mercy incites disagreement within black communities. Shifting 
claims from culpability to contrition inflames the resentments of white 
communities. Adding to this internal discord is the external friction 
generated by prosecutor-community and prosecutor-state conflict. 
Offender and victim communities may clash with prosecutor-slated 
goals and claims. Federal, state, and local agents may also spar over 
the ranking of prosecutor goals and claims. 
Restorative discretion concedes a broad spectrum of conflicts 
dividing communities and the state. It anticipates both internal dissen­
sion voiced within communities and external dissent announced within 
the state forums of administrative agencies, courts, and legislatures. 
Unsure of the exact permutations of dissension, it insists that the 
resolution of these conflicts occur in a grassroots collaborative 
context, rather than by paternalistic decree. The key to resolution is 
the renunciation of colorblind prosecution. 
Community-guided restorative discretion is color-conscious. Re­
j ecting the pretense of neutrality as false and unproductive, it substi­
tutes candor in addressing the histories of racial violence and in set­
tling the differences of racial community. Candor introduces an open 
process of prosecutorial decisionmaking. That process is republican: it 
calls for civic participation and public deliberation in setting the goals 
and claims of race case prosecutions. It demands the development of 
midlevel procedures that are responsive to racial status, multiple party 
and nonparty interests, and competing private and public needs. And 
it relies on independent practical j udgment and community collabora­
tion. 
The institutional development of midlevel procedures to guide 
prosecutorial discretion builds from the groundwork of restorative 
j ustice. 181 Out of that groundwork come claims of atonement and 
181. See DENNIS SULLIVAN & LARRY TIFFT, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: HEALING THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF OUR EVERYDAY LIVES (2001 ); David H. Bayley, Security and Justice for 
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counts, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1 (Michael Tonry & Norval Mor­
ris eds., 1 999); Joan W. Howarth, Toward the Restorative Constitution: A Restorative Justice 
Critique of Anti-Gang Public Nuisance Injunctions, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 717 (2000); 
Glenn M. Kaas, Restorative Justice: A New Paradigm for the Prosecutor, PROSECUTOR, 
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mercy.182 Those claims challenge conventional theories of punish­
ment183 and deterrence,184 giving rise to an exploration of alternative 
sanctions.185 Steering a path between vengeance and forgiveness,186 the 
exploration leads to an evolving reconceptualization of racial violence 
as a hybrid form of legal-political crime. Conceived as such, race cases 
afford the opportunity to consider alternative prosecutorial strategies 
borrowed from restorative and transitional justice experi­
ments abroad, for example in South Africa under the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission187 and in East Germany.188 Those alterna­
tive strategies of racial reconciliation rest heavily on narrative.189 
Nov./Dec. 2000, at 31; Clifford Shearing, Transforming Security: A South African Experi­
ment, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra, at 14. 
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David M. Lerman, Forgiveness in the Criminal Justice System: If It Belongs, then Why Is It So 
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The narratives of restorative discretion break from the lexicon of 
retributive punishment in prosecuting race cases. They depart in 
search of redemption and reconciliation. The language of redemption 
speaks of contrition and atonement. The language of reconciliation 
talks of forgiveness and mercy. Both invoke the rhetoric of community 
on behalf of the offender, victim, public, and state. Borne of violence, 
that rhetoric may ring empty. Enlarging its meaning outside of the 
adversary tradition requires translation. 
Prosecutorial translation of the retributive tradition into a restora­
tive approach to criminal j ustice for offenders, victims, and their 
adjoining communities depends on narrative. Restorative narratives 
strive for empathy. Locating offender and victim stories in the racial­
ized histories of segregated communities, they seek to promote 
empathic understanding in lay public and private forums, and among 
legal and political decisionmakers. Understanding differs from 
enlightenment. It arises from hearing stories of racial violence in 
common places: churches, schools, and public squares. Hearing stories 
provides the basis for cross-racial learning and dialogue in the 
innumerable venues of law, culture, and society. For public agents and 
private citizens, dialogue across racial lines contributes to an informed 
and empathic decisionmaking process in criminal j ustice and civic gov­
ernance. 
The adversarial practices of the criminal-justice system shackle the 
open search for information documenting racial violence and obstruct 
the dialogue essential for the redemptive resolution of race cases. The 
task of restorative discretion is to unfetter that search and to stimulate 
dialogue. The goal is to initiate and, if possible, sustain a 
multigenerational conversation between black and white communities 
about their mutual interests in redemptive justice. 
Numerous obstacles jeopardize that conversation. Narratives are 
typically disjointed and contradictory. Stories are often incomplete 
and misleading. Dialogue is fragile and ephemeral. And empathy is 
vulnerable to the cognitive staining of color. But none of these deficits 
is more devastating than internal community strife. Internal divisive­
ness over the goals and claims of race prosecutions compromises the 
ability to repair black communities and redeem white communities. 
To surmount these obstacles, prosecutors must engage offender 
and victim communities and their subgroups in a discussion about the 
shared benefits of reparation and redemption. Law offers no universal 
narrative or story capable of conveying those benefits. Because the 
benefits accrue differently to black and white communities, and 
splinter further within multicultural communities, colorblind discourse 
(2002); Jamie L. Wacks, A Proposal for Community-Based Racial Reconciliation in the 
United States Through Personal Stories, 7 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 195 (2000). 
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fares badly}90 Instead of race-neutral or binary accounts of sociolegal 
benefit, prosecutors must draw upon the communities' diverse identity 
resources, finding common ground in social difference and historical 
alliance in Iaw. 191 
By celebrating difference and its defense under criminal and civil 
rights law, prosecutors may be able to overcome status distinctions 
between and among racial communities. Those distinctions are 
enmeshed in symbolic and narrative descriptions of racial superiority 
and inferiority. The descriptions objectify and, thereby, deform 
offenders and victims. Interwoven in law and society, the process of 
objectification in contemporary race prosecutions too often reduces 
white offenders to objects of segregationist zealotry and black victims 
to feeble objects of pity. Neither punishment nor acquittal will arrest 
this reductionist tendency. Moreover, neither result will save its 
objects and their extended communities from harm. 
In race cases, harm is experienced on individual and collective 
planes. For black victims and their communities, harm stigmatizes 
racial status. Black stigma is signified by powerlessness. Standard 
discretion attributes victimization to powerlessness, accenting its 
irremediable condition. It conjures images of historical vulnerability 
and passive resistance. Part of the purpose of race-conscious restora­
tive discretion is to show that black victims actively resisted violence 
and that the intervening years of state inaction cloaked constant grass­
roots struggle.192 Juridically restoring the historical power to resist 
individually and to struggle collectively against violence redeems the 
status of black communities in American law and society. That 
restoration of power enables those communities to demand punish­
ment and yet pronounce mercy. The forgiveness underlying mercy 
redeems black communities in spirit and civic culture. For white 
offenders and their communities, mercy offers the reciprocal opportu­
nity for atonement and redemption. 
Race case prosecutors redeem black power in opposition to, and in 
conciliation with, the forces of white violence in northern and 
southern states. Redeeming the oppositional stance of black communi­
ties to white violence corrects misapprehensions of racialized roles in 
the historical record. Those misapprehensions led to the demeaning of 
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tural Discourse for a Post-Reparations World, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 127 
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black character and community in law.rand society. Restorative discre­
tion affirms the dignity of black character and the centrality of black 
community to the pursuit of equality. Redeeming the conciliatory 
stance of black communities to white communities that harbor fugitive 
zealots renews the spirituality of the civil rights movement.193 Renewal 
slackens the adversarial pull of retributive punishment, offering the 
prospect of mercy, forgiveness, and reconciliation.194 
Prosecutorial-urged reconciliation in race cases is a practical 
enterprise. It occurs in the painful context of brutal fact and failed law. 
Its success is less contingent on case selection and strategy than on the 
capacity to bring candid, race-conscious perspectives to the prosecu­
tion of long-standing incidents of white-on-black violence. Tailored to 
the changing identity of offenders and. victims, those perspectives look 
for guidance in cross-racial conversations and collaborations.195 No 
longer merely accountable to the state or unaccountable to the 
morality of race,196 redemptive prosecutors engage the contested 
judgments of interracial community. 
CONCLUSION 
Part of a larger project devoted to the study of race, lawyers, and 
ethics within the criminal-justice system, this Essay set out to conduct 
an investigation of the recently renewed prosecution of long dormant 
criminal and civil rights cases of white-on-black racial violence. Both 
descriptive and prescriptive in orientation, it tried to capture the 
normative and sociolegal meaning of this now resurgent prosecution. 
The purpose of securing that elusive meaning was to cast and recast 
the parameters of the prosecutor's redemptive role in cases of racial 
violence. 
The Essay commenced its appraisal of prosecutorial norms and 
practices in retrying cases of white-oQ-black violence with a brief 
survey of race in relation to law and community, a review of race case 
genealogy, and a summary of renewed prosecution efforts in criminal 
and civil rights cases from the 1950s and 1 960s. To discover a justifica­
tion for retrying race cases, the Essay evaluated the standard concep­
tion of prosecutorial discretion, its intrinsic and extrinsic sources of 
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content, and its staunch ties to the adversary system. Next it analyzed 
the notion of race-conscious discretion and its adaptability as an alter­
native justification. Last it assessed the idea of community-guided 
restorative discretion as a more compelling theory of justification. At 
each tum, the Essay attempted to reweave prosecutorial ethics and 
community norms in retrying cases of racial violence.197 
It is unlikely that weaving a redemptive role for prosecutors in 
cases of racial violence and spinning out strands toward state­
sponsored restorative conciliation will soon reform the criminal-justice 
system or reconstruct community. Nonetheless, they demonstrate the 
potential importance of prosecutorial leadership in teaching parties, 
nonparties, and the public about the different historical realities of 
racial dignity and inequality in law and society. This race-conscious 
pedagogy of prosecution may prove useful to legal education, law 
enforcement, and civil rights advocacy.198 It also may serve to 
reinvigorate hate crime and bias laws, and promote interracial j ustice. 
For prosecutors entangled in the historical filaments of racial identity 
and narrative, redemption may seem inapposite. The call of lawyer 
shame and redemption, however, echoes throughout the American 
legal history of race.199 The echo of redemptive prosecution sounds the 
highest calling. 
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